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Prisons: Trying to catch up (The News Tribune, in Tacoma, Washington,
says Governor Gary Locke is proposing a major prison construction program
that will burden the state with eight prisons by 2003. "We're building a new
1,000-bed prison every 26 months," Locke said after revealing his budget plan
last month.)
From: "Bob Owen@W.H.E.N." (when@olywa.net)
To: "HempTalkNW" (hemp-talk@hemp.net)
Subject: HT: WA Prisons: Trying to catch up
Date: Fri, 1 Jan 1999 19:18:40 -0800
Sender: owner-hemp-talk@hemp.net
Prisons: Trying to catch up
When state opens next one, it'll be time to build another, Locke says
Joseph Turner; The News Tribune
OLYMPIA - The state will open a new prison near Aberdeen next year, but it
won't take long for it to fill up with the 1,936 inmates it is designed to
house.
State prisons already are so crowded that the state Department of
Corrections is sending 150 to 200 prisoners to other states later this
month. And that number could increase by several hundred by January 2000,
when the $194 million Stafford Creek Corrections Center in Grays Harbor
County opens.
So Gov. Gary Locke is proposing a major prison construction program that
will add space at existing prisons and add yet another new prison - the
state's eighth - by 2003.
"We're building a new 1,000-bed prison every 26 months,'' Locke said after
revealing his budget plan last month.
Once Stafford Creek opens, Washington will start taking back its prisoners
from out of state, said Jim Thatcher, the prison system's chief of
classification and treatment. But there won't be any room left over.
"Most of the bed space already will be accounted for by the time Stafford
Creek comes on line," Thatcher said.
Ten years ago, Washington prisons had a surplus of space - so much, in fact,
that as many as 2,000 inmates from other states were being housed here, for
a fee.
But Washington's prison population is on the rise. Voters and the
Legislature have passed laws to mete out longer sentences to sex predators,
repeat offenders and armed felons. And the segment of the population that is
most likely to commit crimes - men between the ages of 18 and 54 - is
growing.
As of October, there were 14,259 men and women in state prisons, including
those in work-release and pre-release centers. That number is expected to
swell to 15,600 by mid-2001.
In some prisons, inmates live in cells with double bunks while prison
officials wait for the new buildings to come on line. Inmates in minimum- or
medium-security facilities can share cells, but not criminals who are in
maximum security, Thatcher said.
Last year, nearly 7,000 people were sent to prison, while only 5,900 were
released. That trend, noted by Locke, has state prison officials already
looking for a place to build another 1,936-bed prison at an estimated cost
of $243 million. Design work would begin next year, but the new facility -
the state's eighth major prison - wouldn't be built until 2003.
In the meantime, Locke is asking the Legislature for $277 million over the
next two years to design, build or expand prison buildings. Among those
projects:
McNeil Island: A new building for sex predators who have completed their
prison sentences but have been civilly committed for treatment. There are
60-80 former inmates in the Special Commitment Center today, but the new $42
million facility would house 200.
"That population is growing more rapidly than originally projected," said
Lanny Snyder, capital programs facility manager for the prison system. "We
want to build them their own building inside the prison walls."
That project would not be built until the 2001-03 budget period.
Purdy: The Women's Correction Center at Purdy will be expanded to provide a
new building for inmates with mental problems, physical disabilities or
geriatric needs and to serve as a reception center for incoming inmates.
The new building also is for 16- and 17-year-old girls who are serving
sentences at adult institutions. They must be kept separate from the main
prison population, a provision which also applies to teenaged inmates at
male prisons.
More than 1,000 state prison inmates are women.
The $25 million addition would be built over the next two years.
Walla Walla: "Lethal fences" would be installed around the building that
holds death-row and other dangerous inmates at the state penitentiary. The
electrified fences are intended as a security and cost-saving measure. It
will cost less to operate the prison because not as many guards will be
needed to watch prisoners from the towers, Snyder said.
"A number of states have gone to a lethal fence system," Snyder said. "It's
an electrified fence that can be set for stun-only. It would not be a lethal
dose, but it would be enough of a shock to deter them."
However, he added, the fences also could have enough voltage to kill an
inmate, so they could be set to stun the first time they are touched and to
kill the next time. Prison officials haven't decided what kind of system to
install yet.
Monroe: Design work would begin on a 512-bed expansion of the Twin Rivers
Corrections Center. The $70 million prison wing wouldn't be built until
2001-03.
In addition, the Special Offender unit, which has 144 inmates with acute
mental problems, would be expanded to house 400 prisoners. That $43 million
project would be built over the next two years.
A 100-bed Intensive Management Unit also would be built at the State
Reformatory at Monroe to house the most difficult inmates. Design work would
begin next year on what eventually would be a $22 million facility.
Joseph Turner covers state government. Reach him at 253-597-8436 or by
e-mail at jjt@p.tribnet.com
***
[sidebar:] South sound stakes in the governor's capital budget
Prisons and colleges would get the bulk of the money in Gov. Gary Locke's
proposed $2 billion capital budget for the next two years. Here are some of
the smaller projects of local interest in Locke's 1999-2001 budget proposal:
University of Washington Tacoma
* $37.7 million for Phase 2 construction of 83,700 square feet of new and
renovated space for about 600 students. The project includes a new science
building and a new classroom building.
Tacoma Community College:
* $1.7 million for a 10,000-square foot addition to the existing student
center.
* $1.5 million to renovate Building 5 to allow space to increase enrollment.
Construction from July 2000 to May 2001.
Bates Technical College:
* $8.4 million for renovations.
Clover Park Technical College:
* $1.2 million to design what eventually would be an $18.7 million
Transportation Trades building for automotive technician, auto-body
technician, automotive parts merchandiser, automotive upholstery and glass,
recreational vehicle technician and marine programs. Construction between
March 2000 and February 2001.
* $9.5 million to build an aviation trades facility for aircraft
maintenance, mechanics and repair and pilot-training programs. Construction
between July 1999 and November 2000.
Green River Community College:
* $3.4 million to replace electrical and mechanical systems and make
buildings compliant with Americans with Disabilities Act. Construction from
July 2001 to July 2002.
* $1.53 million contract to remodel Lindbloom Student Center building.
* $7.5 million to buy and develop property in downtown Kent.
* $350,000 to buy Lea Hill Park from King County.
* $3.4 million for drama and music classrooms and labs.
Highline Community College:
* $6 million to build a 22,500-square-foot addition and renovation of
Building 30 to accommodate computer labs, new entryway and fire sprinklers.
Construction between September 1999 and October 2000.
* $117,000 for predesign of what eventually would be an $18 million 21st
Century Careers Center for occupational training. Construction would not
begin until July 2003.
* $2 million to buy the Federal Way Center, currently being leased by the
college for classrooms.
Museum of history and industry:
* $5.75 million to move the Museum of History and Industry in Seattle from
its present location near the University of Washington into the Washington
State Convention and Trade Center in downtown Seattle.
State Historical Society:
* $1.7 million for earthquake-resistant work at the Stadium Way facility.
Rainier School:
* $450,000 for the laundry facilities at the Buckley school for the
disabled.
Western State Hospital:
* $800,000 to finish renovation of a mental hospital ward.
Orting Soldiers Home:
* $1.8 million to upgrade the fire alarm, electrical and heating systems.
Minter Creek:
* $400,000 to finish renovation of the fish hatchery.
Court of Appeals - Tacoma:
* $2.45 million for office renovations.
The governor's proposed budget also would designate $5.6 million for the
Building for the Arts Program, which provides up to 15 percent of the cost
of projects if local groups come up with the balance. Among those projects
are:
* International Glass Museum in Tacoma ($750,000)
* Knutzen Theatre in Federal Way ($413,000)
* Tacoma Art Museum ($1.25 million)
(c) The News Tribune
***
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-------------------------------------------------------------------
Man Of The Year: Marvin Chavez (OC Weekly says the medical marijuana
patient's "crime" was providing marijuana to other terminally ill
and disabled Orange County residents. And unlike the police and prosecutors
whose efforts led to his conviction last month on three marijuana-related
felony charges, Chavez is anything but sophisticated. A straight-forward man
by nature, the 42-year-old Santa Ana resident's chief crime was that
he believed in the goodwill of the law-enforcement community and seriously
misunderstood the legal complexities of Proposition 215, California's 1996
"Compassionate Use" initiative. It's too bad Chavez didn't wait for elected
leaders to catch up to voters. Had he waited, he might have been celebrated
as a hero. But to the hundreds of people in Orange County whose lives
have been made more endurable because of the sympathy and bravery
of Marvin Chavez, there's no waiting. He's already a hero.)
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 1999 19:43:16 -0800
From: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org (MAPNews)
To: mapnews@mapinc.org
Subject: MN: US CA: Man Of TheYear: Marvin Chavez
Sender: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org
Reply-To: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org
Organization: Media Awareness Project http://www.mapinc.org/lists/
Newshawk: FilmMakerZ
Pubdate: Fri, 01 Jan 1999
Source: OC Weekly (CA)
Copyright: 1999, Orange County Weekly, Inc.
Contact: letters@ocweekly.com
Website: http://www.ocweekly.com/
Author: Nick Schou
MAN OF THE YEAR: MARVIN CHAVEZ
In the eyes of the law, Marvin Chavez is a convicted felon. In the
words of the man who busted him, now-retired Orange County Deputy
District Attorney Carl Armbrust, Chavez is a "street drug dealer" who
ran a "sophisticated drug operation" and "hid behind the law."
Chavez's crime was providing marijuana to terminally ill and disabled
Orange County residents. And unlike the police and prosecutors whose
efforts over the past 12 months led to his conviction last month on
three marijuana-related felony charges, Chavez is anything but
sophisticated. A straight-forward man by nature, the 42-year-old Santa
Ana resident's chief crime was that he believed in the goodwill of the
law-enforcement community and seriously misunderstood the legal
complexities of Proposition 215, California's 1996 "Compassionate Use"
initiative.
Prop. 215 passed in November 1996, when California voters
overwhelmingly voted to allow terminally ill and disabled people to
grow and smoke marijuana. As it turned out - and this is where people
like Chavez get in trouble - the law doesn't spell out precisely how
people too sick to grow marijuana for themselves can obtain a drug
still illegal under state and federal law.
Chavez's second crime was that he lives in Orange County. Had he lived
somewhere else - say Arcata or Oakland - he would still be a free man;
instead, he faces the possibility of a several-year prison sentence.
Chavez grew up in the industrial, working-class barrio of Huntington
Park. In 1972, when he was just 17, Chavez dropped out of high school.
He begged his mother to sign paperwork allowing him to join the Marine
Corps Reserve before his 18th birthday. She did, and Chavez served in
the Corps for the next six years. In his spare time, he worked
construction jobs and ultimately went into business for himself as a
small contractor. He married and fathered two children, and then like
millions of people who survived the 1980s, he developed a bad habit:
cocaine. In 1991, Chavez was convicted of possession and sent to
Tehachapi state prison for two years.
Determined to get his life on track, Chavez participated in a
work-furlough program. While being transported with several other
inmates to a work site, Chavez suffered a back injury when the van he
was in struck a parked Jeep.
"From that day on, for the next five years, I was misdiagnosed,"
Chavez says. "They thought I was horseplaying because I was a convict."
Chavez was transferred to the state prison in Chino, where he worked
in the dining room. Mopping the floor one day in 1992, Chavez slipped
and injured his back once again. Unable to walk or stand straight, he
was finally given some pills and a back brace before being released
from prison the next year.
Free once again, Chavez found himself in constant pain. Worse, the
medication he had been prescribed was turning him into a zombie. He
didn't just feel no pain; he felt nothing at all and was incapable of
even leaving the house. "The medication made me a hermit," he
remembers. "I had mood swings. I didn't want to communicate with my
sons. The side effects were too hard on me. I didn't want to be around
people."
He went to a doctor who ran a blood test and made the startling
discovery that Chavez was suffering the onset of a genetically
inherited spinal condition that can sometimes be triggered by back
trauma. The disease, anklyosing spondilitis, inevitably fuses the
victim's bones until complete paralysis takes over. It's a process
that is as excruciatingly painful as it sounds.
From visits to a public library and through appointments with local
doctors, Chavez learned that many in the medical community saw
marijuana as a safer, healthier painkiller and appetite-inducer than
several of the medications he was already taking.
Shortly after Prop. 215 passed, Chavez, then living in Garden Grove,
decided to set up a nonprofit cannabis co-op, the Orange County
Cannabis Patient- Doctor-Nurse Support Group. His goal was to help
make marijuana available to sick people on fixed incomes who were
unable to grow it for themselves.
If Chavez was a drug dealer, he was an inept one. In late 1996, just
weeks after Prop. 215's passage, he spoke with Garden Grove city
officials, announcing his intention to open the co-op. He pleaded
fruitlessly with the city elders for permission to set up an office
somewhere in the city and wrote letters to Orange County Sheriff Brad
Gates expressing his hope that OC law enforcement would work with him
to ensure that the co-op would remain on the good side of the law. He
religiously advertised his efforts in the local media, expanding on
his vision with any reporter who would listen.
The press interviews, the City Hall speechifying, the letters: it was
an odd campaign for someone allegedly trying to run a criminal drug
operation. But that's exactly what authorities said Chavez was doing
when they arrested him in January 1998.
Officials say they first discovered Chavez's criminal activities in
late 1997, when police busted former San Bernardino County Sheriff's
Deputy David Herrick in a hotel room with several baggies of marijuana
marked "Not for Sale. For Medical Purposes Only." Herrick admitted he
was a member of Chavez's co-op and allegedly told the cops he worked
for Chavez.
It was in the first week of January 1998 at Herrick's trial in the
Orange County Superior Courthouse in Santa Ana that Chavez met the man
who would ultimately make this a year he'll never forget: Armbrust.
Armbrust approached Chavez and asked him if he had received his
subpoena to appear at Herrick's trial. Chavez said yes and introduced
himself. The two shook hands. The rest is history.
What follows is only a brief summary of the major events of Chavez's
life, culled from the pages of the OC Weekly over the past 12 months:
On Jan. 14, just days after Chavez shook hands with Armbrust, police
arrested Chavez and charged him with eight felony counts of selling
marijuana. After a few days in county jail (during which time he was
denied access to his medicine), a judge released Chavez with the
admonition that he stop providing marijuana to members of his co-op.
At the time, Chavez promised to do that. But when a patient Chavez had
been helping-and who also had been subpoenaed by Armbrust to appear at
Herrick's trial-died of cancer, Chavez had had enough of being told
what to do.
Police arrested Chavez again, along with OC cannabis co-op co-founder
Jack Schacter, on April 9. They charged the pair with several more
counts of selling marijuana to sick members of the co-op. The
rationale: since money sometimes changed hands (because Chavez and
Schacter accepted $20 donations to keep their co-op going), it was illegal.
Besides, police said, at least two of the people Chavez had provided
with marijuana weren't even sick, although they did have doctors'
notes saying they were. They were undercover cops equipped with a
forged doctor's note.
"I wasn't surprised at all that I was arrested," said Chavez. "I was
just surprised at how long it took for them to do it and how it
actually happened."
On July 17, Herrick, who was not permitted to use Prop. 215 as a
defense, was sentenced to spend four years in prison. A week later,
Armbrust offered Chavez five years' probation-and no jail time-in
return for a renewed promise that he would ignore his conscience and
stop distributing marijuana to members of his organization. Chavez
refused.
In November, voters in four other U.S. states and the District of
Columbia passed initiatives similar to Prop. 215. Meanwhile, Chavez's
case went to trial, and he was convicted of three felony counts of
selling marijuana and one count of sending it through the mail to a
sick co-op member in Chino. A victorious Armbrust left the courtroom
smiling; it was his last day in office, and he had gotten his man after all.
But the jury's verdict was mixed-and apparently shaped by Prop. 215.
Although it convicted Chavez of three felony charges, the jury handed
him misdemeanor convictions on five remaining charges where it
believed he was guilty only of giving away marijuana to sick people,
still a violation of state law, but consistent with the intent of Prop. 215.
Chavez faces one more hurdle in the new year: his Jan. 29, 1999,
sentencing hearing. Chavez says that if he is sent to prison, he'll
campaign to force authorities to allow him to smoke his medicine and
will organize other disabled or chronically ill patients behind bars
to stand up for their rights under the law.
By then, of course, the men who put Chavez behind bars will be gone
from public life: Armbrust; Armbrust's boss, outgoing District
Attorney Mike Capizzi; and Sheriff Brad Gates, who campaigned
vociferously against Prop. 215.
Also out of the picture will be state Attorney General Dan Lungren,
who directed the crackdown on cannabis clubs throughout the state from
his Sacramento office. He'll be replaced by the state Legislature's
Bill Lockyer, whose sister and mother died of leukemia. Lockyer voted
for Prop. 215 and followed Chavez's prosecution closely in the media.
Regardless of what happens to Chavez on Jan. 29 - and we wish him the
best - 1999 is shaping up as a much different year where Prop. 215 is
concerned. It's too bad that Chavez didn't wait for elected leaders to
catch up to voters before he risked his own liberty. Now, the
political establishment prosecutes him as a common criminal; had he
waited, he might have been celebrated as a hero. But to the hundreds
of people in Orange County whose lives have been made more endurable
because of the sympathy and bravery of Marvin Chavez, there's no
waiting. He's already a hero.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Drug Prohibition And Public Health (An article in the January-February issue
of Public Health Reports, the journal of the U.S. Public Health Service,
by Ernest Drucker, Ph.D., a professor of epidemiology and social medicine
at the Montefiore Medical Center of the Albert Einstein College of Medicine,
says the relationship of prohibition to usage rates and health consequences
of drug use has never been fully evaluated. An examination of national data
for 1972-1997 shows that over this 25-year period, despite drastic increases
in enforcement costs and an overall decline in the prevalence of casual drug
use, there have been dramatic increases in drug-related emergency room visits
and drug-related deaths. Further, while black, Hispanic, and white Americans
use illegal drugs at comparable rates, there are dramatic differences in the
application of criminal penalties, drug-related emergency department visits,
overdose deaths, and new HIV infections related to injecting drugs. These
outcomes may be understood as public health consequences of policies that
criminalize and marginalize drug users and increase drug-related risks
to life and health.)
Date: Wed, 13 Jan 1999 15:21:26 -0800
From: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org (MAPNews)
To: mapnews@mapinc.org
Subject: MN: US: Drug Prohibition And Public Health
Sender: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org
Reply-To: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org
Organization: Media Awareness Project http://www.mapinc.org/lists/
Newshawk: Kevin Zeese http://www.csdp.org/
Source: Public Health Reports, Journal Of The US Public Health Service
Pubdate: Jan-Feb, 1999
Contact: phr@nlm.nih.gov
FAX: 617-565-4260
Mail: Public Health Reports, Room 1855, JFK Federal Building, Boston, MA 02203
Author: Ernest Drucker, PhD
Note: Dr. Drucker is a Professor of Epidemiology and Social Medicine,
Montefiore Medical Center/Albert Einstein College of Medicine, a Senior
Fellow with the Lindesmith Center/Open Society Institute, and
Editor-in-Chief of the journal Addiction Research.
Note: Address correspondence to Dr. Drucker, Dept. of Epidemiology and
Social Medicine, Montefiore Medical Center, Bronx NY 10467; fax
718-798-6378; e-mail drucker@aecom.yu.edu
Note: The tables and figures, not provided with this post, are currently
available with the article in Adobe's PDF format at:
http://www.of-course.com/drugrealities/acrobat.htm
"We are making a difference. Drug use is down 50% over the last decade." -
President William J. Clinton, Preface to The National Drug Control
Strategy, 1998 [1]
"When assessing evidence, it is helpful to see a full data matrix, all
observations for all variables, those private numbers from which the public
displays are constructed. No telling what will turn up." - Edward R. Tufte [2]
DRUG PROHIBITION AND PUBLIC HEALTH
S Y N O P S I S
FOR THE PAST 25 YEARS, the US has pursued a drug policy based on
prohibition and the vigorous application of criminal sanctions for the use
and sale of illicit drugs. The relationship of a prohibition-based drug
policy to prevalence patterns and health consequences of drug use has never
been fully evaluated.
To explore that relationship, the author examines national data on the
application of criminal penalties for illegal drugs and associated trends
in their patterns of use and adverse health out-comes for 1972-997.
Over this 25-year period, the rate at which criminal penalties are imposed
for drug offenses has climbed steadily, reaching 1.5 million arrests for
drug offenses in 1996, with a tenfold increase in imprisonment for drug
charges since 1979. Today, drug enforcement activities constitute 67% of
the $16 billion Federal drug budget and more than $20 billion per year in
state and local enforcement expenditures, compared with $7.6 billion for
treatment, prevention, and research.
Despite an overall decline in the prevalence of drug use since 1979, we
have seen dramatic increases in drug-related emergency department visits
and drug-related deaths coinciding with this period of increased enforcement.
Further, while black, Hispanic, and white Americans use illegal drugs at
comparable rates, there are dramatic differences in the application of
criminal penalties for drug offenses. African Americans are more than 20
times as likely as whites to be incarcerated for drug offenses, and
drug-related emergency department visits, overdose deaths, and new HIV
infections related to injecting drugs are many times higher for blacks than
whites.
These outcomes may be understood as public health consequences of policies
that criminalize and marginalize drug users and increase drug-related risks
to life and health.
***
WE ARE BY NOW accustomed to sharply opposing view-points and conflicting
claims about our national drug policy and its results. A succession of
Presidents and Congresses have led the field with calls for a "drug-free"
America and "zero tolerance" and have enacted drug prohibitions with
ever-harsher criminal penalties and more militant (and more expensive)
enforcement tactics. In contrast, libertarian reformers like Nobel Prize
winner Milton Friedman or conservatives like William F. Buckley, Jr., call
for outright legalization of all drugs. And others (this author among them)
call for a public health or "harm reduction" approach, [3] reasoning that
dangerous drugs will always be with us and that we had better learn how to
live with them in a way that minimizes their adverse health and social
consequences.
While this debate rages, we see continued (even rising) drug availability
and ever-shifting patterns of drug use: crack and cocaine use are down, but
marijuana and heroin use are becoming more popular among young people. [4]
And, over the last decade, new and more lethal consequences of illicit drug
use have emerged--including infectious disease epidemics (AIDS, TB,
hepatitis B, and hepatitis C) linked to unsafe injecting and to the
marginal life of the criminalized addict.[5] Meanwhile, of course, huge
numbers of people continue to be arrested and imprisoned for drug offenses,
the most specific expression of a policy based on prohibition and a
punitive approach to drug users.
Yet despite constant appeals for more and better drug treatment, we still
see severe shortages in treatment programs [1] as well as limited success
in dealing with the severest forms of addiction, that is, to heroin and
cocaine. There is new and important Federal support for Methadone [6] (the
drug treatment of greatest proven efficacy for heroin addiction [7] ), but
public opinion remains sharply divided on the use of narcotic maintenance
with New York's Mayor Guiliani recently calling it "enslavement" and taking
steps to end treatment for thousands of patients currently under care in
the city.[8]
Further, while AIDS has refocused our attention on drugs as a public health
problem, raising the stakes for epidemiologic research and demanding
effective interventions to reduce the spread of HIV infection, even massive
international documentation of the effectiveness of needle exchange
programs has failed to shift a hostile
Federal policy that bans funding for such programs because they give the
"wrong message," that is, something other than "zero tolerance."[9]
What then are our goals in drug policy? And what should they be?
If "winning the war on drugs" was once the battle anthem of national drug
policy, that metaphor is now rejected by many, including Gen. Barry R.
McCaffery, Director of the White House Office of National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP), as fostering "unrealistic expectations for a speedy victory
and a specific end to the campaign."[10] The General now believes the fight
against cancer to be a better analogy--"stressing prevention and
treatment."[10]
Notwithstanding this more health-oriented view and the growth in Federal
support for treatment programs, prohibition remains the major strategic
goal of our national drug policy, under which treatment continues to be
"backed up by a high level of social and legal disapproval" [10] and the
strict enforcement of drug laws. This is most evident in the allocation of
expenditures in the National Drug Control Budget for fiscal year 1998. Of a
$16 billion total, more than $10.7 billion (67%) was devoted to drug law
enforcement, interdiction, and supply reduction in the US and abroad.[1] In
addition to representing the lion's share of current Federal funding,
enforcement expenditures have shown almost two decades of steady
growth--increasing tenfold since 1981. [1] (See Figure 1.) In the same
period, Federal support for treatment and prevention has grown by only half
that amount.[11]
Even the recent innovation of drug courts, which steer arrested nonviolent
users to treatment, represents an extension of Federal enforcement policy
and funding priorities. This approach is still based on the continued
vigorous prosecution of drug users, while using the criminal justice system
to enforce compulsory treatment. Further, Federal budgets reflect only a
small part of all public expenditure for drug control. In this country,
most law enforcement occurs at the municipal and state levels, where annual
enforcement expenses are estimated at more than $20 billion,[12] compared
with approximately $7.6 billion for treatment from all government and
private sources. [13]
Thus, as we follow the money for the past 25 years, it is clear that
enforcement has been the centerpiece of our drug policy, far outstripping
other approaches to the problem. The consequences of disproportionate
spending for enforcement are most visible in our society in the high rates
of arrest and incarceration for drug offenses [14] (Figure 2), the
increasing proportion of criminal justice activities devoted to drug
offenses, and the rise in both over the past 25 years.
While overall crime rates today are at their lowest in the past 25 years,
arrests for drug law violations have reached a record high--more than 1.5
million in 1996, the latest year for which complete data are available.[14]
State and Federal prisons and local jails today hold more than 400,000 drug
law violators--60% of all Federal prisoners and more than 25% of state and
local inmates.[14] (See Figure 2.)
Although rates of drug use were already declining rapidly by 1980, between
1980 and 1990 there was a 1055% increase in new commitments to state
prisons for drug offenses (from 8800 to 101,600).[15] New commitments
continued to rise into the 1990s (Table 1).
In 1980 there were 51,950 drug law violators behind bars in state and
Federal prisons (8% of all inmates). By 1995 this number had increased more
than 700% to 388,000 (25% of all inmates in a prison population now four
times as large). This growth represents the clearest expression of a policy
based on prohibition and the vigorous application of criminal sanctions for
the use and sale of illicit drugs.
The surge in incarcerated populations in the 1980s was due to harsher
enforcement policies and longer mandatory sentences for possession of
smaller quantities of drugs, including disproportionate penalties for
possession of crack cocaine. This resulted in progressively longer prison
terms for drug offenses and a widening gap in sentence length between drug
offenders and those convicted of violent crimes [16] --which has helped
increase the proportion of the prison population behind bars for drug
offenses (Figure 2).
And while some individuals are in prison for major trafficking offenses or
violent crimes, more than 90% of drug offenders are arrested for possession
or for low-level drug deals to support their personal use.[16]
It is clear from these data that we have practiced what we preach,
literally with a vengeance. There are more drug offenders behind bars today
than the total incarcerated population of 1970. [17] Indeed, drug
enforcement has accounted for such a large increase in our prison
population that the US is now the Western democracy with the highest per
capita rate of imprisonment.[18] What have been the effects on the patterns
of drug use of this vast natural experiment in drug control policy?
Proponents of a drug policy based on prohibition and its rigorous
enforcement claim that their approach is working. See, for example, Figure
3, reprinted here from the ONDCP's 1998 National Drug Control Strategy,[1]
which is used to support this contention. It shows that self-reported past
month use of any illicit (that is, illegal) drug, and specifically of
cocaine and marijuana, have declined sharply since 1985.
While Federal drug control officials admit that the problem is still
serious, costing at least 14,000 lives and $110 billion a year,[1] they
assert that our approach has increased societal disapproval of drug use and
lessened the extent and severity of the drug problem.
Citing reductions in "casual use" of all illegal drugs by 50% (and of
cocaine by 75%) since 1979, [1] in its 1998 National Drug Control Strategy,
the ONDCP claims that we will do even better in the future and sets a new
10-year goal of a 50% reduction in overall drug use in America, to a level
below the lowest point attained in the last 30 years.[1]
These claims are greeted with some skepticism given the growing world
market in illicit drugs. We are seeing greater availability of higher
purity drugs at lower prices; from 1981 to 1996 the average price per pure
gram of cocaine fell by 66% and the average purity of street heroin rose
from 6.7% to 41.5%.[1]
Increased crop acreage and expanded international traffic have driven a
steady rise in the number of consumer and producer nations to at least 140
countries and a $500 billion world market, as has been well documented by
the ONDCP, the US Drug Enforcement Agency, Interpol, and the United Nations
Drug Control Program.[1]
In a world awash in drugs, with widespread economic hardship and social
dislocation to motivate their continued production and distribution, can we
succeed in protecting our nation from drugs and their dangers by the
application of our current policies?
Apparently not.
Despite reductions in adult use, the latest data from national surveys [19]
show a sharp climb since 1991 in the prevalence of illicit drug use among
American high school students--despite decades of intense enforcement and
powerful anti-drug messages. (See Figure 4.) This primarily reflects
increased use of marijuana, but use of the harder drugs also appears on the
increase.[19] These climbing rates of teen use are a sentinel for the
failure of our current policies to reduce the number of new users of
prohibited drugs. And, interestingly, they are echoed in teen use of legal
drugs-tobacco (despite the anti-tobacco crusades of the last few years) and
alcohol--neither of which may be legally sold to people in this age group.[19]
Are there other ways in which our drug policies are failing us? What do the
data show?
EVALUATING ALL AVAILABLE EVIDENCE
Fortunately, in this country, we are in a position to evaluate the
long-term relationship between drug policy and drug use by examining in
detail some of the public health consequences of that policy. We have more
than 25 years of information on changes in patterns of drug use in the US
population and may hold these up alongside data on the use of criminal
penalties, identifying long-term trends and health and social outcomes.
Sources Of Data On Drug Use.
The United States has the best funded, largest scale, longest functioning,
and methodologically most consistent drug use surveillance and data
monitoring system in the world. There are three major sources of national
survey data on drug use in the United States:
(a) The National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (NHSDA), conducted by the
Federal government since 1973, measures the prevalence of drug and alcohol
use among the US household population ages 12 years and older; expanded in
1991 to include college students, homeless shelters, and the military.
(b) Monitoring the Future (MTF), conducted for the National Institute on
Drug Abuse by the University of Michigan; surveys high school seniors
(since 1972), and 8th through 12th graders (since 1982).
(c) The Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN), a data collection program of the
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), in
place since 1972; annually samples more than 400 hospital emergency
departments (ERs), reporting on ER visits in which both legal and illegal
drugs are implicated, and also tallies medical examiner reports of deaths
in which drugs and alcohol are implicated.
Each of these surveys and the data they report have limitations: the
household survey (NHSDA) underrepresents the homeless, and the survey of
high school seniors (MTF) misses school dropouts, both groups with higher
than average rates of drug use (for example, school dropouts are reported
to have two to four times the rate of cocaine use of non-dropouts [1] ).
And DAWN does not capture all hospital ERs. Another limitation, of course,
is that given public law and private sentiment, one would expect a certain
amount of under-reporting of personal drug use to researchers. This is
probably most true for heroin, for which some Federal studies warn of
substantial underreporting.[1] For these reasons, "harder" data on measures
of drug-related morbidity and mortality, which are less dependent on
self-report and more public than use per se, should be closely watched,
recognizing that these reflect the adverse consequences of drug use and not
simply its prevalence.
But, despite these short-comings, data from large, ongoing, national
surveys are very useful because they are consistent in their limitations
and biases and allow us to create a reliable comparative picture of
patterns and time trends in the prevalence of drug use over the past 25
years. They also permit us to see the demographic profile of drug users and
to identify changes in this population over time.
TRENDS IN POPULATION PREVALENCE, 1972-1977
Data on the prevalence of drug use are available by year for the major
social and demographic categories (age, sex, "race") and for each of the
illicit drugs (as well as for tobacco and alcohol use). The NHSDA collects
data on use in the respondent's lifetime ("ever used"), in the past year,
and in the past month ("current use").
NHSDA household survey data show that in 1997, 36% of the adult population
ages 12 years and older reported some illicit drug use in their lifetimes,
but that number dropped to 11% for use in the past year and 6% for the past
month [20] - ratios that have not changed significantly in the national
data in a generation despite changes in prevalence.[21] These data show
that most illicit drug users are not "hard core" addicts and that most
experimental or casual use does not eventuate in continued or regular use.
From a public health perspective, past-month use is the most appropriate
measure for looking at long-term changes in the prevalence of drug use
because it captures all "current" or regular users (including dependent
users) but only a small percentage of the much larger group who may have
used drugs a single time or who are experimental or casual users. Figure 4
shows the NHSDA prevalence data for US population ages 12-17 years for
past-month use of illicit drugs.
As most health risk is associated with regular exposure to the "major"
drugs - cocaine, heroin, stimulants, depressants, and hallucinogens,[22] it
is useful to focus attention on the long-term trends in past month use of
these drugs independently from trends for marijuana, which has consistently
shown a higher prevalence since data collection began in the 1970s than all
other illicit drugs combined.
Unlike the data beginning in the mid-1980s that are presented to support
the claim that our policies are working to reduce the prevalence of drug
use (see, for example, Figure 3), these more complete and specific data on
time trends make clear that the prevalence of drug use in the US has
followed no simple course over the past 25 years. Use of the "major"
illicit drugs rose in the early 1970s from a 1960s level estimated at less
than 2% of the adult population ages 12 and older,[21] peaked at about 6%
in 1985, and declined until 1992, when it started to rise again among teens
(although the 1990s average was still only 2.3% of the adult population)
(Figure 4).
Trends In The Use Of Specific Drugs.
While overall population trends in the use of any illegal drug are
informative, individuals use specific drugs. Figure 6 shows 1979-1996
trends for each of the most commonly used illegal drugs. It is immediately
apparent from this Figure that prevalence levels for the various drugs are
markedly different and that each drug exhibits a different trajectory of
use over the years.
Marijuana dominates the picture, accounting for over 93% of all reported
use of illicit drugs-- more than all other illicit drugs combined. Past-
month marijuana use reached a peak of 13.2% of the adult (greater than 12
years) population in 1979 and declined until 1993, when it began to climb
again--although to only a fraction of its former level, reaching 4.7% by 1996.
Cocaine use rose most sharply exactly as marijuana use was declining,
peaking at 4.6% of the adult (greater than 12 years) population in 1988 but
declining to the 0.7% to 1% range for 1990-1998. The NHSDA reported heroin
use to be relatively stable, at less than 0.1%, throughout the years from
1972 through 1979.
(Heroin use is particularly covert and subject to rapid local changes in
availability and use, changes not well captured in the household survey
method, and the NHSDA does not claim great accuracy or reliability for its
heroin data.)
While there are no more reliable surveys than the NHSDA from which to
document national levels of the use of heroin, the ONDCP has estimated
(relying on local field studies and modeling techniques) that there are
810,000 chronic users of heroin in the US,1 0.3% of people ages 12 years
and older. According to the ONDCP, this group now includes more younger
(new) users, among whom there is clear evidence of a shift away from
injecting to sniffing, an important change for AIDS risk but one that does
not necessarily make the drug safer.[1] Do these trends in the prevalence
of drug use bear any relationship to the steady rise in enforcement that we
have seen over the same time period? The details about who uses drugs (and
who does not) provide important clues to this relationship.
WHO USES ILLICIT DRUGS?
While the overall prevalence of drug use and the drugs of choice may have
changed over time, the characteristics of the populations using these drugs
has been more stable.
Figure 7 shows the demographics of the population using illegal drugs for
selected years from 1979 through 1997.
Gender. From Figure 7, we can see that over this 19-year period, male use
regularly outstripped female use by about 2:1 and both showed proportionate
rises and declines as overall prevalence changed over time.
Age. Initiation of the use of all drugs, both legal and prohibited, is
principally an event of adolescence, especially ages 12 through 17. But the
18-25 age group, the group most at risk for criminal activity, arrest, and
imprisonment, [16] consistently has the highest prevalence of use. We see
lower rates of use as individuals "age out" of the lifestyles and social
networks in which they used drugs; however, the increase in youthful drug
use in the 1990s created new cohorts, some of whom will continue use as
adults. So, for the present, we see a shift in the age mix of the
drug-using population in the direction of youth. For example, in 1979, only
21% of current drug users in the 12-34 age category were younger than 18
years of age, but by 1997 that proportion was 33%, albeit of a total
population of users half the size.
"Racial" category. A common stereotype, fostered by the media, is that some
"racial" or ethnic groups use drugs more than others. This is not borne out
by the data. There are only small differences across "racial" categories in
the prevalence of illegal drug use. And the declines in drug use seen from
1979 through 1997 are reflected in all groups. Some small age- and
drug-specific differences by "racial" category appear over this 19-year
period--for example, marijuana and amphetamine use has been heavier among
whites, and cocaine use somewhat higher among blacks.
But these differences are neither large nor consistent, and the recent
trend of rising use in the 12-17 age group reflects virtually identical
increases in the prevalence rates for all "racial" categories.[20]
While the prevalence of drug use is an important measure of changing trends
over time, from a public health perspective we are most concerned with
health effects, seen in morbidity and mortality related to drug use. How do
trends in these adverse outcomes correspond to the substantial changes we
have seen in both enforcement and prevalence over this 25-year period? To
answer, we turn to the data from the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN).
ADVERSE OUTCOMES
DAWN was established in the mid-1970s by the Federal government to monitor
two important outcomes of drug use--drug-related hospital ER admissions and
deaths in which drugs are implicated. Surprisingly, these data show a
distinctly different time trend from the data on the prevalence of drug use
in the same time period (Figures 5 and 6).
Both drug-related ER visits and deaths climbed steadily after 1979, the
peak year for all drug use, rose most sharply in the mid-1980s just as the
prevalence of use was declining most rapidly, and continued to rise through
the 1990s, despite low and stable drug prevalence among adults. Drug-
related ER visits rose by 60% from 1978 to 1994 (from 323,100 annually to
518,500) while overall ER visits increased by only 26%.[22]
These increases are most strongly associated with the use of cocaine and
heroin (Figure 8), which together account for fewer than 4% of all illegal
drug use but are mentioned in more than 40% of all drug-related ER visits
and more than 90% of deaths due to overdoses. And while there are a growing
number of overdose deaths seen among the new, younger users of heroin,[1]
the age-adjusted death rates show increases in every age group for the
period 1985-1995,22 with the highest rates in the 35-44 age group (an older
cohort of established users).[23]
Overall, drug-related deaths more than quadrupled from 1976 to 1995--from
2136 to 9097 annually.[22,24-38] (See Figure 9.)
It would appear that drug use is becoming more dangerous.
Even as the numbers of drug users have gone down, the per-user rates of ER
visits and fatalities have been much higher since the mid-1980s. If we
measure the success of our drug policy in terms of adverse public health
outcomes instead of prevalence of drug use, it is clear that we are doing
worse, not better.
But if the time trends in drug-related morbidity and mortality do not
correspond to trends in the overall prevalence of adult drug use, as we
would expect them to, what accounts for the sharp climb in both as
prevalence declined? And to what extent is this increase a reflection or
result of our drug policy? To answer these questions it is necessary to
disaggregate the data.
DRUG POLICY IN BLACK AND WHITE
Disaggregating the data on adverse outcomes and drug enforcement by "race"
suggests that the greater the intensity of criminal penalties, the greater
the public health danger of drugs.
The enforcement of drug laws is not applied equally to all groups: despite
comparable rates of drug use, African Americans are disproportionately
represented among imprisoned drug offenders. Figure 10 shows white, black,
and Hispanic drug law violators as a proportion of all state prison inmates
for 1986 and 1991. Today, state prison incarceration rates for African
Americans for drug law violations are almost 20 times those of whites and
more than double those of Hispanics.[14] From 1990 to 1994, incarceration
for drug offenses accounted for 60% of the increase in the black population
in state prisons and 91% of the increase in Federal prisons.[14] This trend
corresponds to the higher proportion of African Americans incarcerated for
all reasons: 6296 per 100,000 adults in 1995, compared with 919 per 100,000
for whites--a ratio of 7.5 to 1. [14] By 1995, 35% of all African American
males ages 25-34 were under the control of the criminal justice
system--behind bars, on probation, or on parole.[39]
Drug enforcement (arrests, incarcerations, probation, parole) may itself be
considered another adverse out-come of drug use--a measure of social
morbidity with enormous negative consequences for those caught up in the
criminal justice system. The damages that a prison record does to a young
person's self-esteem and social and economic prospects are well known. In
addition, a recent study reveals that in 1998, 3.9 million convicted felons
(which includes all drug offenders), were disenfranchised as citizens and
lost the right to vote.[40] Reflecting the disproportionately high rates of
prosecution for drug offenses, disenfranchisement of African Americans
occurs at three to four times the rate of whites. In states with the most
restrictive voting laws, as many as 40% of African American men are likely
to be permanently disenfranchised, according to the study's authors.[40]
I would suggest, however, that drug enforcement can also be viewed as an
independent variable--a causal factor responsible for worsening many of the
social and public health problems that we normally attribute to drug use
per se.
Effects Of Differential Enforcement.
Prohibition criminalizes all drug users, buyers and sellers equally. For
those who are drug-dependent or addicted and cannot gain access to
effective treatment, these laws dictate a life of crime and of degradation,
deceit, and (for the poor) prostitution and drug trafficking to obtain the
money needed to shop in a violent and expensive marketplace. Further, the
drug user is continually exposed to risks to health and life--to infectious
diseases through the re-use of injecting equipment (also criminalized and
still prosecuted under drug paraphenalia laws) and to the unpredictable
effects of illicit substances of unknown purity or potency. The powerful
stigma of addiction relentlessly pushes the addict to the margins of
society, away from family and social supports, medical attention, and
employment--all factors that mitigate the dangers of drug use and promote
recovery.[41]
Although these pervasive influences of prohibition affect all users of
prohibited drugs, the data show that the most negative health consequences
of drug use are not evenly distributed--they fall most heavily on those who
experience the highest rates of drug enforcement, African Americans.
When the data are adjusted for the correct population denominators, they
reveal a huge discrepancy in rates of adverse outcomes. While we see an
overall rise in drug-related ER admissions for the total population
throughout a long period of declining drug use (especially declines in the
use of cocaine), these rates are very different across "racial" subgroups.
African Americans fare dramatically worse than whites; in 1996, African
Americans had 7.5 times the white rate of heroin-related emergency
department visits and 11.5 times the white rate of cocaine-related visits
(Table 2).
In 1996, African Americans, who represent only 12% of the US adult
population [42] and a similar percentage of drug users, accounted for 57%
of ER drug admissions while whites (75% of the population 26 and a
proportionate number of drug users) accounted for 31%.[12]
A similar pattern is seen in the racially disaggregated data on overdose
deaths in this period. African Americans have 3.5 times the rate of drug
fatalities of whites,36 and while the overall trend is an increase for all
groups, from 1980 to 1993 there was a 326% increase in drug abuse deaths
for blacks but a 129% increase for whites and others (Figure 11).
CONCLUSION: DRUG PROHIBITION VS PUBLIC HEALTH
Large disparities in drug-related morbidity and mortality appear to be a
powerful consequence of prohibition drug policies and their unequal
application in our society. (See Table 3.) But they also point to a set of
larger problems, evident in the historic relationship of US drug policies
to public health. In the United States we have a long history of strong
public sentiment about the use of all intoxicating substances--we alone in
the Western world altered our national Constitution to ban alcohol for 14
years. Today's drug policies may be understood as the expression of an
(almost) innocent wish to make dangerous drugs disappear by legislating
their prohibition.
A plausible case can be made that as drug use rose in the 1960s and 1970s,
extending more widely and more openly into middle-class America,
increasingly severe criminal penalties for the use of prohibited drugs and
more rigorous enforcement was a predictable response. While the avowed
motive of this policy, restraining the damages that can be caused by drugs,
was (and is) a legitimate social goal, the cure has only worsened the disease.
Drug laws and their massive, cruel imposition on millions of young men and
women--not simply the use of drugs--have stigmatized and estranged our most
disadvantaged minorities, creating a "new American Gulag"[18] with its own
archipelago of prisons, jails, courts, probation, parole, and, most
recently, compulsory treatment as an alternative to incarceration, blurring
the boundary between treatment and punishment. As we build prisons instead
of schools, the images of young black men being arrested and imprisoned for
drug offenses continue to fill the news media. While all the data suggest
little systematic difference in the prevalence of drug use by "race" or
ethnicity, these images foster the belief that nonwhite Americans use drugs
more than other Americans--an assumption that goes largely unexamined by a
public systematically frightened about our children's almost inevitable
exposure to drugs.43 At the same time, our prejudicial enforcement of drug
laws and the wholesale criminalization of a large cohort of young
inner-city residents serves to sustain and reinforce this stereotype while
fostering social, economic, and political disenfranchisement [44] and
increasing the health and life risk associated with use of drugs.
Drugs can certainly cause harm, but our selective application of punitive
drug prohibition laws are at least as dangerous. These laws have spawned a
lethal biosocial ecology in which the poorest nations and communities are
ravaged by uncontrolled criminal drug markets,[45] emerging infectious
diseases,46 and the widespread corruption of civil society.[47]
Drugs are cheaper, more powerful, and more available today then at any time
in the past 25 years. This new and complex political reality cries out for
effective policies based on sound science, public health priorities and
human rights.[48-50] Yet, after nearly a century of a bankrupt approach to
drug control, we see no end in sight. In June 1998, delegates from all over
the world heard Pino Arlacchi, Executive Director of the UN Office for Drug
Control and Crime Prevention, address the General Assembly's Special
Session on International Drug Control with calls "to start the real war
against drugs and convince nations and people that there could be a
drug-free world."[51]
Effective and publicly acceptable alternatives to a prohibition- based
policy are now available to us in the form of harm reduction approaches
(including needle exchange programs, low threshold treatment, and improved
access to housing and health care for drug users). Harm reduction is
already national policy in a score of countries throughout the world.[52]
But in the US the very use of the term harm reduction is still banned from
the Federal policy lexicon and denied funding because it is seen as
"condoning drug use." Its proponents are vilified as supporters of drug
legalization,[53,54] and critics within the government are cowed into
silence (or anxiously whispered support at AIDS conferences). And there can
be severe penalties for open dissent--as we saw in the case of Surgeon
General Joycelyn Elders.
These are not-so-early warning signs of a great American failure--not only
in drug policy but in our native capacity for creative, compassionate, and
above all open discourse about issues vital to our well-being. It is time
that we move beyond this drug fundamentalism and abandon our unhappy
history of prohibition for more humane and pragmatic policies that protect
public health and support our democratic values.
The author thanks Jennifer McNeely for assistance with this article.
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{MAP URLs: http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v98/n032/a04.html
http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v98/n032/a03.html }
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The New Politics Of Pot (The January issue of Governing magazine,
a periodical for politicians published by the Congressional Quarterly,
predictably tells the pols what they want to hear. Ignoring the schism
between the public and politicians regarding medical marijuana, revealed
again in November's elections, the magazine focuses instead on a purported
schism between the successful mainstream approach of Americans for Medical
Rights and the grassroots activism traditionally fostered by NORML -
implicitly implying that all NORML has to do to achieve comprehensive reform
nationwide is to get everyone to put on suits, quit listening to "reefer
music" and otherwise adopt mainstream tactics.)
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 1999 18:55:39 -0800
From: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org (MAPNews)
To: mapnews@mapinc.org
Subject: MN: US: The New Politics Of Pot
Sender: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org
Reply-To: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org
Organization: Media Awareness Project http://www.mapinc.org/lists/
Newshawk: Dave Fratello (amr@lainet.com)
Pubdate: January 1999
Source: Governing Magazine (US)
Section: Feature, page 32
Contact: mailbox@governing.com
Website: http://www.governing.com/main.htm
Copyright: Copyright 1999, Congressional Quartely, Inc.
Author: Russ Freyman
THE NEW POLITICS OF POT
When advocates of medical marijuana couldn't make headway with policy
makers, they took their campaign directly to the voters.
Standing in the foyer of a hotel in Washington, D.C., Bill Zimmerman
looks a bit uncomfortable talking with a reporter who is sporting a
long, gray beard, wearing a lime green shirt and representing a
publication called High Times. Both men are attending a conference
sponsored by the National Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws, a
group that for many years has pushed for a broad overhaul of national
laws governing cannabis. But amid the festival-like atmosphere - "reefer
music" blares, vendors hawk products made from hemp, and activists carry
guitar cases and pamphlets that tout the benefits of recreational marijuana
use - the smartly dressed Zimmerman, with a copy of the New York Times tucked
under his arm, seems out of place.
Indeed, some members of NORML were overheard condemning him and the
speech that he delivered on the opening day of their annual meeting
last November. It's not that they question his credentials: Zimmerman
holds a doctorate in neuroscience, runs a California political
consulting group and recently published a book entitled "Is Marijuana
the Right Medicine for You?" Rather, they are critical of the
mainstream tactics he has used in recent successful efforts to
legalize marijuana for medicinal use in half a dozen states.
Although his strategy has been focused on getting voter referendums
passed in individual states, Zimmerman's ultimate goal is to have the
federal Drug Enforcement Administration change marijuana from a
Schedule I substance (meaning it has no accepted medical use in the
United States and is highly addictive) to Schedule III status (on a
par with Tylenol with codeine).
Zimmerman's approach does not mollify more radical activists, however.
Nor does his personal belief that the drug should be decriminalized. A
significant segment of NORML thinks that Zimmerman and Americans for
Medical Rights, his Santa Monica-based organization that spearheaded
the 1996 initiative allowing certain patients to smoke marijuana for
medical purposes in California and Arizona, have betrayed the cannabis
movement. They demand removal of all penalties for the private
possession of marijuana by adults.
For his part, Zimmerman refuses to criticize NORML and its supporters,
although his silence when asked about them is telling.
The differences between the two groups go a long way toward explaining
why the marijuana debate has reappeared on the political radar screen
after a decades-long hiatus. Americans for Medical Rights has been
remarkably effective at portraying the medical use of marijuana as an
issue of compassion, rather than of potheads and addiction. The group
made its mark with the two victories in 1996 and then struck gold this
past November, winning votes in Alaska, Nevada, Oregon, Washington and
again in Arizona, where the state legislature forced voters to
validate their 1996 decision on medical marijuana. Polls indicated
similar propositions would have been approved in Colorado, where the
secretary of state invalidated the ballot initiative, and the District
of Columbia, where Congress refused to appropriate money to certify
the results.
How did Zimmerman and Americans for Medical Rights successfully alter
the political landscape on which the medical marijuana issue rests?
For starters, they ran the campaign like a campaign. Zimmerman brought
a wealth of experience managing political races. He helped one member
of Congress win reelection in 1998 and has steered several other
ballot initiatives to victory this decade. He also introduced
time-tested polling tactics to the marijuana measures and, most
important, Americans for Medical Rights attempted to appeal to
mainstream voters, for whom NORML's agenda of sweeping reform and
eventual legalization is taboo.
And while some marijuana advocates spent time debating among
themselves whether hemp oil can reduce cholesterol levels, Americans
for Medical Rights booked doctors on television and radio programs to
discuss how those suffering from glaucoma, chemotherapy-related nausea
or AIDS "wasting" syndrome can benefit from pot. They talked at length
about research and cited a favorable editorial that appeared in the
New England Journal of Medicine. "It was understood," Zimmerman says,
"that this would be a professional campaign."
Dr. Rob Killian is a family practitioner and the leader of Washington
Citizens for Medical Rights, which successfully pushed the state's
Initiative 692. "More of us are seeing it work," he says of medicinal
marijuana. And to him, it seems clear that the messenger is just as
important as the message. "We're using spokespeople who are
mainstream," Killian says of the effort in Washington, where he told
supporters to stop wearing tie-dye and listening to reefer music in
public. He laments, however, that "there are some activists who refuse
to play the game in a winning way."
Equally significant is the manner in which Americans for Medical
Rights and the state organizations associated with them--Killian's
group as well as Oregonians for Medical Rights, Coloradoans for
Medical Rights and so on--have recast the marijuana issue in terms of
the patient's needs. As a result, many hospice workers and nurses, as
well as AIDS and cancer-patient advocacy groups, have lent their support.
"Dying and suffering patients should not be arrested for using
marijuana as a medicine under their doctor's supervision," says Dr.
Richard Bayer, who practices internal medicine in Portland, Oregon,
and was the chief petitioner of the state's successful Initiative 67.
He was heard by voters across the state advocating the usefulness of
marijuana in helping patients deal with pain, fight nausea and help
improve their appetite. Apparently, Oregonians responded to his plea
to have compassion for those who are very ill.
Despite these recent developments, opponents of legalization
efforts--most notably federal and state policy makers and the law
enforcement community--remain firm in their belief that the medical
marijuana movement is just a smoke screen. General Barry McCaffrey,
the White House's drug czar, maintained that proponents in California
and Arizona in 1996 were trying to take a step toward full
legalization. "This is not medicine," he declared. "This is a Cheech
and Chong show."
Law enforcement officers contend that allowing people to use marijuana
could lead to the use of harder drugs as well as make pot more
accessible to youngsters. In addition, they are critical of the
"loose" wording of these ballot initiatives, arguing that the language
about possession and distribution is far too ambiguous. Multnomah
County Sheriff Dan Noelle, who led the campaign against medicinal
marijuana in Oregon, is convinced the public is being hoodwinked.
"This is a national effort with the primary funders working on an
agenda to legalize," he says.
In fact, "medical rights" groups across the country have been
bankrolled, essentially, by three men: billionaire international
financier George Soros, insurance magnate Peter Lewis and John
Sperling, who founded the for-profit University of Phoenix. All of
them have stated publicly that American drug laws make no sense, that
governments should focus on treatment more than punishment and that
marijuana should be decriminalized.
Rhetoric aside, Noelle's observation that the campaign is coordinated
and national in nature is certainly accurate. Although local activists
played a role in the marijuana victories in each state, groups such as
Oregonians for Medical Rights have led the charge--and acknowledged
that they receive some 95 percent of their funding from the national
Americans for Medical Rights. "It's no secret that this is a
multi-state effort," says Amy Klare, a campaign coordinator for
Oregonians for Medical Rights.
University of Southern California Law Professor Charles H. Whitebread,
the author of several works detailing the history of marijuana laws,
is surprised at the results. But then Americans for Medical Rights, he
notes, did something heretofore unheard of. "They demystified this
drug and got rid of the notion of reefer madness."
Many people insist, however, that more research on smoked marijuana
must be conducted before doctors should be able to prescribe it. While
government health officials are hesitant to approve studies, a key
report by the National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine will
be released soon. For the time being, the influential American Medical
Association has come out against the marijuana initiatives.
"Referendums and legislation are not the right way to make scientific
decisions," says an AMA spokesman. "Its efficacy should be established
through well-controlled clinical trials."
The marijuana lobby responds that cannabis is one of the most studied
drugs in history. George Washington University Law Professor Peter H.
Meyers, a former NORML attorney who teaches a class on drugs and the
law, says, "Perhaps we know more about marijuana than any other drug."
In advocates' minds, the overwhelming opposition boils down to
politics. They point to the example of a DEA administrative judge who,
in 1988, said a brief filed by NORML calling for a change to Schedule
II (narcotic, stimulant and depressant drugs) had merit. "Marijuana,
in its natural form, is one of the safest therapeutically active
substances known to man," the judge wrote. But the DEA officially
rejected the opinion. "The only reason they didn't allow medical use
of the drug," asserts Meyers, "is for purely political reasons."
Clearly, the DEA and Congress are not about to change their current
opinion on the matter anytime soon. In fact, the House passed a
resolution opposing medicinal marijuana in 1998. So Zimmerman is
counting on votes in 2000 in Colorado, Maine and Nevada (where state
law requires voters to pass an initiative twice before it can be
enacted) to further pressure the federal government and state
legislatures. Referendums are also possible in Michigan, Ohio and
Massachusetts.
Zimmerman is adamant that his group's only goal is to allow patients
to smoke marijuana as a medicine. Whether or not that could lead to a
slippery slope of use and abuse remains an open question, but it is
hard to dispute the effectiveness of his tactics so far. "The fact
that they have bitten off a small little piece," says USC's
Whitebread, "and treated it like a political campaign is the reason it
is successful."
