America's #1 Crop - Marijuana Tops the Charts

According to figures recently released by The National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML), our current administration's heartfelt plans for the eradication of marijuana have gone awry.

Thanks to a bumper marijuana harvest, increased indoor growing, and a drop in the price of corn, an illegal crop has become our country's most valuable crop for the first time in history. It is, however, not the sort of groundbreaking trend the Drug Enforcement Agency has been hoping for.

NORML estimated the worth of the 1985 harvest at $18.6 billion, a $2 billion increase over 1984. California, Hawaii and Oregon are by far the largest producers. Also increasing is the percentage of marijuana grown in the United States versus the amount imported from abroad. Last year, 60% of the marijuana sold in this country was home-grown, an increase of 5% over 1984.

NORML's figures are based on a careful "trend analysis" of advertising, grow light sales, sales of marijuana grow books, local media reports, personal interviews, and agricultural conditions.

Estimated Agricultural Crop Values In The United States, 1985

     Crop                                $ Value of Production

 1  Marijuana*                                18,600,000,000
 2  Corn for Grain                            18,582,500,000
 3  Soybeans                                  10,183,500,000
 4  Hay                                        9,980,500,000
 5  Wheat                                      7,256,500,000
 6  Sorghum                                    3,820,500,000
 7  Cotton                                     3,705,100,000
 8  Tobacco                                    2,744,800,000
 9  Potatoes                                   1,363,400,000
10  Rice                                       1,014,000,000

Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture - Crop Reporting Board,
Agricultural Prices, Washington, D.C., October 31, 1985.

U.S. Department of Agriculture - Crop Reporting Board, Crop Production,
Washington, D.C., October 10, 1985.

All prices are farmgate prices, i.e., prices received by farmers.

*Marijuana crop value is estimated by the National Organization for the
Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) from published reports, news articles,
personal interviews, law enforcement estimates, trend analysis, consumer
analysis and grower analysis.

Although National NORML has not tried to place a value on domestically grown marijuana since 1993, its estimates used to be considerably more accurate than those of the Drug Enforcement Agency. For example, in 1982 the DEA reported at the end of the year that it had eradicated more marijuana than it had estimated Americans consumed at the beginning of the year.

Given the DEA's results-oriented bias in reporting, it is understandable that in 1996, as this is posted, the latest news from the DEA ("Marijuana Information Packet," Drugs & Crime Data, April 1995, Office of National Drug Control Policy, Drugs & Crime Clearinghouse, 1-800-666-3332) does not even attempt to estimate current domestic production. (The same packet does estimate production in many other countries, however.) Instead, the April 1995 "Marijuana Information Packet" cites only its 1992 estimate, in inconvenient metric tonnage...:

It is very difficult to estimate the amount of marijuana actually produced in the United States in 1993 as there are no national surveys conducted of outdoor cannabis cultivation. [They don't even want to think about indoor cultivation - Portland NORML] In 1992, there was an estimated gross 6,000 to 6,500 metric tons cultivated (does not include low-potency wild ditchweed plants). However, this figure is considered to be inexact. Approximately 1,840.2 metric tons representing 4.04 million cultivated plants were eradicated in 1993. Domestic seizures of cannabis and marijuana totalled 394 metric tons compared to 347 metric tons in 1992. ("Production," p. 62, ibid., quoting from the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee, The NNICC Report 1993, The Supply of Illicit Drugs to the United States, August 1994.)

During the 1980's, prices for a pound of commercial grade marijuana ranged from $350 to $600. In 1993, the price ranged from $1,000 to $9,500 per pound, though the sale price typically did not fall below $1,500 a pound.

As reported in past Portland NORML weekly news releases, the price of sinsemilla has been stable at about $250 an ounce since the early 1990s, but can frequently cost up to $350 an ounce, depending on quality. That would mean the "retail" value of a 16-ounce pound would be $4,000 to $5,600. Hence, an average wholesale or "farmgate" value of $3,000 per pound for domestically grown marijuana seems a quite reasonable, even conservative figure with which to compute the ensuing estimates. The figure of $3,000 per pound is also near the low end of the government's estimated range of $1,000 to $9,500, and consistent with anecdotal information reported by such sources as High Times' monthly market quotes and the Price Report Project, an internet-based effort to monitor the street prices of marijuana and other illicit drugs internationally.

According to Webster's dictionary, a metric ton equals 2,204.6 pounds. Thus the government's estimate (above) that "In 1992, there was an estimated gross 6,000 to 6,500 metric tons cultivated" would mean domestic cultivators grew 6,000 x 2,204.6 = 13,227,600 pounds to 6,500 x 2,204.6 = 14,329,900 pounds. At $3,000 per pound, the government's estimate would thus mean the value of the domestic marijuana harvest would be worth between $3,000 x 13,227,600 pounds and $3,000 x 14,329,900 pounds, or between $39,682,800,000 and $42,989,700,000 - about $39.6 billion to $43 billion.

The vast majority of the commercial marijuana harvested in Oregon is probably sinsemilla, which is worth at least two to three times as much as seeded marijuana. (After the marijuana consumer removes the many seeds from his or her less-expensive, imported product, he or she is reportedly left with an amount of usable material that weighs and is worth about the same as sinsemilla.) For obvious economic reasons, cloned sinsemilla is said to be almost the only type of marijuana grown in indoor gardens around the nation, and the most recent evidence at hand suggests outdoor growers elsewhere in the United States similarly strive to produce seedless harvests. (It's not clear if law enforcement always subtracts males - which outdoor growers generally kill before maturity - in its eradication tallies, but that is just one variable revealing the speculative nature of measuring proscribed behaviors.)

The cautious reader may want to revise the estimate above to show the value of the domestic marijuana harvest after police confiscations. As the quote above from the April 1995 "Marijuana Information Packet" states, "Domestic seizures of cannabis and marijuana totalled ... 347 metric tons in 1992." Multiplied by 2,204.6, those 347 metric tons would equal 764,996.2 pounds. Multiplied by $3,000 per pound, that would mean law-enforcement agencies reduced the value of the American pot harvest by $2,294,988,600, or just over $2 billion, to between ($39,682,800,000 minus $2,294,988,600 equals) $37,387,812,400 and ($42,989,700,000 minus $2,294,988,600 equals) $40,694,712,400, or about $37.3 billion to $40 billion.

Apparently the DEA has published figures for this period that are actually near the high end of that estimate. Although Portland NORML does not have the source documents, California Lawyer in September 1994 cited DEA figures "reveal[ing] that domestic pot production is worth $42 billion yearly. According to DEA estimates ... America's consumers spend more green on smoke than on the silver screen: Pot's contribution to the gross national product dwarfs the motion picture industry's 1992 receipts of $26 billion and the television industry's paltry $18 billion.

In summary, even though the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse suggests that marijuana use declined steadily after 1979, supposedly reaching a post-Vietnam-era low in 1992, the government's own figures strongly imply that domestic production of marijuana rose in that period, more than doubling in estimated value from $18.6 billion just in 1985 to somewhere between $37.3 billion and $43 billion as long ago as 1992. Even after discounting inflation and population increases, the available evidence and the overall trend suggest that despite (or perhaps because of) unprecedented arrests, incarcerations and "just say no" campaigns, marijuana has become even more entrenched as America's No. 1 crop.

If one assumes a 100 percent increase in the value of domestic marijuana production between 1985 and 1992, it would seem reasonable to infer that the 1992 value of Oregon's harvest increased to between $2 billion and $2.3 billion, from $1 billion to $1.15 billion in 1985.

Since 1992, there is little reason to think the value of domestically grown marijuana has declined, either in Oregon or the nation at large. An upward trend from the 1980s to 1992 in estimated values of domestic harvests is acknowledged by everyone from the DEA to High Times. Population has increased, particularly in Oregon, and there have been widespread reports that marijauna use has increased since 1992.

If one accounts for the federal government's widely noted tendency to underestimate illicit-drug figures, the actual numbers are likely to be greater - possibly far greater - rather than less.

Unfortunately, neither the NORML nor government documents at hand attempt to estimate the number of Americans who cultivate marijuana.

Selective Prosecution in the Five-County Portland Area

Additional information on the methodological problems
involved in DEA estimates of domestic marijuana cultivation,
from Jon Gettman

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I can speak to any details of any NORML report on domestic marijuana
cultivation from 1986 on because I did them all. The last one I did was in
1993, and I reviewed the domestic cannabis eradication program from 1982
to 1992. With each report, I tried to improve the estimation method used.
The $42 billion figure comes from an estimation model which was
subsequently improved. The last report, released in 1993, is the one I
think is most accurate.

However, I think an estimate of $10 to $20 billion is more realistic, and
the range depends on whether one takes a conservative or generous view of
the assumptions implicit in making such an estimate.

The DEA would eradicate a particular amount of marijuana in a year, and
then claim they eradicated x% of the crop. I would look at the data and
make my own guess that they were being too optimistic, and that they
eradicated y% of the crop. Plug in assumptions about average yield per
plant, market value, and some other factors, and one can convert %
eradicated into value of crop harvested. In this type of model, the DEA
assumption of 1 pound/plant really skews the estimate upward. After the
model produced the $42 billion figure, I revised it to reflect more
realistic assumptions. (And yes, the DEA has clung to such a estimate for
years, and used it to skew estimated production from cultivation busts to
ridiculously high figures.)

DEA no longer makes such an estimate, and for that matter neither do I. At
this point it is safe to say that the domestic marijuana crop can neither
be estimated nor eradicated.

Jon



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Excerpts from "Cannabis Suppression and Marijuana Crop Value"
by Jon Gettman

Note: this excerpt refers to exhibits from the full report; those exhibits
have not been included.

11) Self Evaluation by the DEA

The DEA thinks that if they go out and seize millions of marijuana
plants, they're doing a good job. Every year the program is a success,
often because their self-created indicators have gone up - more plants,
more grow rooms, more seizures, etc. For example:

"The increase in the number of plots and plants eradicated during
1985 is attributable to an increase in eradication efforts
(manpower/financial) and refined reporting procedures as well an increase
in public awareness and public participation in the overall drug abuse
prevention program." 1

At this time the NDEPB was warning of the dangers in getting caught
up in too zealous of a prosecution policy, a warning that was to be
ignored. "The systematic destruction of illegal plots requires an
extensive commitment of manpower, which cannot be siphoned off by futile
attempts to determine the ownership of each plot."2 They provided a 20
point prescription for greater program success:

"1) look for large organizations
2) target significant states
3) keep 50 state program
4) make the locals get the ditchweed
5) upgrade intelligence
6) increase aviation
7) states should pick up surplus DoD equipment
8) encourage states to use more small aircraft
9) encourage growers to inform on patch pirates and violent growers
10) enhance prosecutions
11) increase penalties for cultivation over 100 plants
12) exempt from liability from loaned DoD equipment unless grossly
negligent
13) DEA staff get less brownie points for cannabis eradication - change
that
14) standardize sentencing
15) improve inter-agency cooperation
16) expand training program
17) prevent leaks like the Delta 9 leaks in August 85
18) build public support with PR
19) invite foreign media to view eradication efforts
20) use herbicides, if they can"3

The DEA incorporated most of these points into their activities in
subsequent years, except they zealously included increasing prosecutions
and asset forfeiture. They still measured success by increasing
indicators, such as:

"In 1987 we had an increase . . . in the number of sinsemilla
plants that were destroyed . . .in the number of cultivated plants
eradicated. . . (and) in the total number of arrests, greenhouses
operations, weapons and assets seized. . . . The overall 1987 Domestic
Eradication Program was a great success. In 1988 we will strive for
increased follow-up investigations and to increase the value of assets
seized."4

While the DEA portrays their work with a sense of pride and
accomplishment, every now and then they publish comments that indicate
the enormity of the task before the cannabis eradication program and the
inadequacy of their efforts. For example: "Also there were not enough
resources available to eradicate all the marijuana plants that were
located." 5 In 1988 they admitted that "More fields were located through
citizen complaints than by random aerial searches,"6 bringing into
question the cost effectiveness of aerial searches, despite the strategic
reliance on helicopter and fixed wing flights.

The DEA has continually had problems with the physical eradication
of discovered marijuana.

"The manpower required to accomplish the physical destruction of
cannabis plots continues to hamper DEA's eradication efforts. The
expansion of intelligence gathering and labor-intensive eradication efforts
are essential for minimizing the availability of domestically grown
cannabis."7

By the late 1980's legal challenges to herbicide use had been
exhausted, though the litigation had established stringent rules and
regulations for herbicide use. In many respects, the desire to use
herbicides in the U.S. was driven as much by foreign policy considerations
as by addressing the DEA's manpower problems.

"Foreign countries have turned to the United States for leadership
in narcotic and drug enforcement because of its support for herbicidal
eradication of opium and cannabis in source countries throughout the world.
The United States resolve is to employ these same eradication techniques,
which have been questionable to some against domestic produced marijuana.
During the past year the traditional manual eradication of cannabis was
supplemented with an ambitious herbicidal spray operation in Hawaii. These
techniques should send a strong message to cannabis producing countries."8

Despite the use of forfeiture, mandatory/minimums, herbicides, and
the use the National Guard and other federal agencies, and after over ten
years of zealous eradication activity, the DEA is left by 1990 to defending
its defining concept rather than its accomplishments.

"It is estimated that about 25 percent of the marijuana consumed in
the United States is produced domestically. Adequate effort and resources
must be expended to deal with the threat. The concept of this program must
be pursued. Continued support from all will ensure a proactive posture in
dealing with this illicit phenomenon."9

Nonetheless, "DEA's goal is to significantly reduce the
availability of cannabis in the United States."10 In a complete shift from
the seizure driven policies of the mid 1980's, the new forfeiture driven
eradication program favors arrests.

"DEA's suppression policies will require a near-term focus on
pursuing the producers, rather than the product. If successful, this
policy will change to targeting distribution networks. The emphasis will
be to vigorously eliminate organizations by increased arrests and
seizures."11

From the DEA's perspective, no one really understands how important
it is to prosecute and incarcerate marijuana cultivators. So, the "DEA
will educate Federal and state prosecutors and the judiciary on the
importance of deterrence in national and international cases."12 They will
also "assist domestic demand reduction efforts by raising public awareness
about the harmful effects of marijuana use. DEA, in cooperation with the
National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA), will aggressively publicize
research findings on the hazards of high-THC products."13 Clearly, the DEA
realized they had a credibility problem that was continuing to grow - they
could only justify their growing seizures, $38 million in 1990, if the
public believed marijuana was a dangerous drug.

It is not a coincidence that the DEA began a new propaganda
campaign in 1990. As reviewed above, in 1989 one of their own
Administrative Law Judges ruled in a petition brought by NORML and other
parties that marijuana had medical value and should be made medically
available. Judge Francis Young stated that the evidence convinced him that
marijuana was one of the safest drugs known to man. The DEA has
politicized the marijuana issue sufficiently to suggest their opposition to
medical use of marijuana is solely based on fear that it will undercut
their prosecution and seizure program.

In his 1990 National Drug Strategy William Bennett called the
domestic marijuana cultivation situation "intolerable" and called for an
increase in funding from $8 million to $16 million in 1990 to wipe it out.
He claimed that success against domestic cultivation "should be a bench
mark of national anti-drug resolve." 14 The DEA was able to triple their
funding of local eradication efforts in 1991 and 1992, with no appreciable
increase in the number of seizures either year.15 (See Exhibit 2.)

Despite all the problems detailed above, and the need to involve so
many other agencies and resources over the years, the DEA has always
maintained that it seized a large percentage of the marijuana grown in the
United States. "Officially, the DEA maintains it eradicated half the U.S.
crop, although privately law enforcers say they snagged only 10 to 40
percent of the total."16 A California based DEA agent claims that outdoor
growing in the state has been reduced by 3/4 .17

Kentucky state police believe they seize no more than half of the
marijuana grown in the state, and they have the most aggressive campaign in
the country after Hawaii's.18

Statistically speaking, if one of the most aggressive programs
only seizes half of the cultivated marijuana, it is impossible for the
entire program to seize half of the country's production. Cultivation is
too diffuse to average 50% in every eradication program, and few states
will boast of eradicating that much of the marijuana crop. Perhaps it is
for this reason that the DEA claims they aim to get 70% of the Tennessee
marijuana crop annually, and that it is the fourth most successful in the
country. 19

Regardless of the DEA's success rate, or lack thereof,
"Domestically grown marijuana accounted for 10% of all marijuana in 1980
this has increased to 25% in 1992, with a production estimate of 4500 -
5300 metric tons. "20

Under these circumstances, with no end in sight, the DEA still
maintains that:

"the program is working. We are doing a measurable good job in
most of the states. With continued dedication, next year we can plan to
strike even harder and keep even more of the marijuana from reaching the
market.""21

12) DEA estimates of domestic marijuana crop

The DEA does not have a good track record in estimating the size of
marijuana crops. "Tip of the iceberg" anecdotes are common, suggesting
that any estimate offered by the DEA be increased several fold.

The DEA method for estimating domestic marijuana production was
first stated in regard to the tip of the iceberg story which began this
report.

"Using a relatively accurate plant count and conservative weight
per plant factors, it is estimated that 1653 metric tons of marketable
marihuana were eradicated. The strategic intelligence estimate for 1981
domestic marihuana production was 1200 metric tons. Therefore, the
program shows that in 1982, 38% more domestic marihuana was eradicated than
was previously believed to exist. Although a total U.S. marihuana
production figure is not easily determined, the statistics obtained from
this program reveal, without doubt, that the United States is becoming a
major source for the drug."22

They also explicitly listed the plant yield criteria they
attributed to current cultivation.

"To arrive at an estimated weight of marketable marihuana for that
which was eradicated, the following factors are used: One sinsemilla plant
yields two pounds of marketable material; one regular marihuana plant
yields one pound of marihuana. These factors are considered
conservative."23

The DEA regularly prints a disclaimer in its reports suggesting
that such estimating was only acceptable when the DEA itself engages in it.
"It should be noted that the total figure of sightings in this report by
no means represents the total number of plots under cultivation in the
United States and no attempt should be made to correlate the two." 24 A
revised comment shows up in every subsequent report.

However, consider this:

"In 1989, 5, 605,460 marijuana plants weighing approximately 2,548
metric tons (MT), were eradicated. DEA estimates that 50% of the domestic
marijuana is being eradicated. This would indicate that approximately
5,096 MT of marijuana was cultivated in the United States in 1989."25
This is making a correlation between the number of plants seized and the
total number of plants grown in the United States.

Furthermore, the statement is an outright falsehood. In every
other context except this specific report, the DEA domestic estimate is
expressed as a net figure, what was not seized. In this context, they
present the figure as a gross figure. This incorrectly minimizes the size
of the market in comparison to other years. The NNICC report for 1989
tactfully ignores this slight of hand, and publishes a net figure of 5000
to 6000 metric tons.26 This indicates that they hold that roughly 8000
metric tons were grown, the DEA eradicated 2500 mt, and 5500 mt was
harvested. This places the DEA's seizure percentage at about 30% of the
crop, not the 50% they claim in their own report. Perhaps they made a
mistake, and it is only a coincidence that it is so self-serving.

A recent report by a DEA agent in California calculates the value
of cannabis in California assuming that they only seize 10% of the actual
crop.27

The DEA's ability to seize a large percentage of the marijuana
grown in the U.S. was called into question above. Their estimates of U.S.
production are called into question here.

In the mid 1980s the DEA maintained that U.S. production was only
12% of the country's consumption.

"Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 12% estimate may be low.
Projections made by a senior U.S. Forest Service official indicate that
domestic production could be about 50% of U.S. supply. In addition, the
Oregon Deputy Attorney General, in testimony before the House Select
Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, stated that the correct figure
"may be as high as 50%." During the interviews conducted. . .officials
offered estimates ranging from 30% to 60%. It is important to emphasize
that these high estimates are impressions rather than conclusions based on
firm data."28

When the DEA estimated that domestic cultivation provided 12% of
U.S. consumption in 1984, they estimated production at 2100 metric tons.
In 1984 the Mexican police raided five separate large scale growing sites
in Mexico belonging to a consortium reputedly led by Caro Quintero. They
seized over 2000 metric tons of marijuana, "8 times more marijuana than
Mexican and American authorities at the time believed was produced annually
throughout Mexico."29

Regardless of the historical accuracy of DEA's estimates, there is
no dispute today that domestically grown marijuana represents tens of
billions of dollars of economic activity. "At minimum, this business is
worth $20 billion to $30 billion a year," says John Sutton, chief of DEA's
cannabis investigations branch (KY)30 The DEA has estimated that domestic
growers have harvested 10 million pounds annually since 1988. (See Exhibit
8.) Their data, without corrections, would place the 1992 crop value at
$26.8 billion.

13) Corrected Estimates of Domestic Marijuana Crop

Estimates of the national marijuana crop which are based on DEA
plant seizures must allow and correct for the following variables: amount
of ditchweed, if any, counted as cultivated plants, the number of males,
the yield of a marijuana plant, the price of marijuana, and the success
rate the DEA attained with their seizures.

In 1988 Hawaii spent $174 per square mile in the state eradicating
marijuana, and the Attorney General estimated that they only seized 20% of
the available crop.31 The vast numbers of plants eradicated annually are
impressive until rated by the sizes of each state. The DEA has distributed
$10 to $13 million to states annually for the last three years to subsidize
eradication programs. In Hawaii, one of the most intensive eradication
efforts, these federal funds amount to over $80/sq. mi. An investment of
time and money of the magnitude returns seizures of about 65 per sq. mi.
In Kentucky and Tennessee, the federal dollars amount to about $15 per
square mile, and the programs seize about 22 plants per square mile. In
Missouri, they spent $7 per square mile, but in 1992 only seized .76 plants
per sq. mi. Most of the federal funds went to eradicating ditchweed.
Marijuana can be grown anywhere, and generally is. Eradicating it is an
expensive proposition. The fact is, the government just hasn't made an
adequate investment in eradication activities. Consideration of program
seizures on a sq. mi. basis has contributed to this reports estimation of
the success rate of the seizures in each state. Programs as intensive as
that in Hawaii, California, Kentucky, and Tennessee are credited with the
highest percentage of seizures, 20 to 50%. While the success percentage is
a subjective criteria, it does reflect quantitative data from ranking plant
seizures by land area.

This reports estimates that the DEA only seized 25% of the
marijuana grown nationwide. Using a price index from High Times magazine,
the estimates of the number of males, and the estimated yield per plant as
discussed below, this report estimates the value of domestic marijuana to
be $27.8 billion. See Exhibit 10. While this figure is about the same as
produced by taking the DEA data at face value, it is based on a much
different assessment of the DEA's activities and effect on the marketplace.
Specifically, DEA overestimates the value of the plants they seize and
their own success rate in eradicating marijuana plants around the country.

14) Comparable Value

Exhibit 11 details the value of legal agricultural crops, and their
financial yield per acre. Exhibit 12 details the value of top crops in
individual states. Marijuana, if legal, would still outgross all of these
crops. Assume 520 female marijuana plants on one acre with wide walkways
between the plants. The plants have adequate spacing, and easy access for
care. At a yield of one pound per plant, and only $150 per pound, this
acre of land has produced $78,000. If the price collapses to $15 per
pound, the acre has still out grossed other crops by providing $7,800.
Marijuana is a multi-use plant, providing fiber, pulp, fuel, and other raw
materials in addition to the valuable flowertops.

Conclusion:

When the price of oil is high, everybody in the business looks to
drill as much as they can. When the price of marijuana is high, growers
look to grow anywhere they can. The DEA eradication/suppression program
has become a market force which encourages proliferation, creativity, and
profitability among domestic marijuana growers. The DEA responses to the
ongoing proliferation of marijuana cultivation in the United States has
been to distort facts and research to enhance their own power and
enforcement capabilities. In many respects, it can be argued that the
domestic cannabis eradication/suppression program has become a permit for
the DEA to lie, cheat and steal. Presumably the reports on this program
have been provided to the U.S. Congress. The reports deceive the congress
and the public on the significance of the plants they seize, as well as
their yield, potency, value, and harmfulness. The DEA has consistently
exaggerated their accomplishments in order to increase their funding, and
exaggerated the threat and danger of marijuana use and cultivation to
justify severe prison terms for many personal use growers and to justify
their ongoing seizure of millions of dollars of assets belonging to private
citizens.

This is an unconscionable program. The operation of this program
is not conducted in accordance with democratic values, nor is the program
in our national interest. By its own standards, the program is
counterproductive and an utter failure.

1) DEA 1985, pg 4
2) NDEPB 1986b, pg 48
3) ibid
4) DEA 1987, pg 1
5) ibid, pg 4
6) DEA 1988, pg 21
7) DEA 1989, pg 4
8) DEA 1990, pg 3
9) ibid, pg 26
10) ibid, pg 32
11) ibid, pg 33
12) ibid, pg 33
13) ibid, pg 33
14) U.S. News & World Reports, 11/16/89
15) DEA, 1992
16) Insight Magazine 7/1/91, pg 13
17) Insight Magazine 7/1/91, pg 17
18) Wall Street Journal 12/24/92. Appalachian Kentucky Relies on Marijuana
To Buttress Economy by Joe Davidson.
19) The Tennessean 12/6/92. State turns top crop into billion-dollar
debris. Sunday Special: Marijuana in Tennessee.
20) DEA 1992, pg 1
21) ibid, pg 28
22) DEA 1982, pg iii (emphasis in original)
23) DEA 1982, pg 5
24) DEA 1983, pg 5
25) DEA 1989, pg 4
26) NNICC, 1989
27) Stowell, 1991
28) NDEPB 1986b, pg 15,16
29) President's Commission on Organized Crime, 1986
30) LA Times News Service: Crop Pot economy rides high 5/17/90
by Douglas Jehl
31) Hawaii Department of the Attorney General 1989

A new 1998 report on the estimated value of domestically produced cannabis was announced by NORML in a news release issued Oct. 15, 1998. Follow the graphic link at the top of this page to the actual report at NORML's web site.]

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