WORMSCAN.&
By David P Beiter
WORMSCAN.& is composed of long stories received from various
Internet sources.
Blocks are filed by date, and marked by three snails at the head.
One paragraph summaries are in WORMSCAN.
Many more incidents are reported in WORMSCAN.
byter@mcimail.com
@@@
881200, US Senate, (GOV DOC # Y 4.F 76/2:S.prt.100-165). In
Date: Thu Feb 22, 1996 8:52 am CST
From: snet l
EMS: INTERNET / MCI ID: 376-5414
MBX: snet-l@world.std.com
TO: * David Beiter / MCI ID: 635-1762
Subject: SNETL: (fwd) Federal facilitation of narcotics smuggling:
the evidence (fwd)
-> NOTICE - this list is MOVING before 3/1/96
-> Send "subscribe iufo" to listserv@xbn.shore.net
LONG. From alt.conspiracy.
Evidence about the drug-smuggling criminals running this country.
Psst ! We peasants are coming with our pitchforks. Fill up those
moats fast.
----Forwarded message-----
Do you want solid evidence that persons at the highest levels of our
government have facilitated the importation of tons of cocaine into
this country? Read on. What follows are excerpts from a government
document called, DRUGS, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND FOREIGN POLICY. This
document, which some had hoped would be lost and buried, was produced
in December 1988 by the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and
International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United
States Senate. It is for sale by the U.S. G.P.O., Supt. of Docs.,
Washington, April 13, 1989. (GOV DOC # Y 4.F 76/2:S.prt.100-165)
Excerpts are from pp. 36, 41, 42-47, 53-58, 59, 60. The guts of it
I`ve boiled down to 5 pages. Key parts are typed in caps, for those
who might only want to skim. Parenthetical remarks are mine.
NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS AND THE CONTRAS
The head of the Costa Rican =91air force,=92 and personal pilot to two
Costa Rican presidents, Werner Lotz, had a very simple explanation for
the involvement of drug traffickers with the Contras in the early days
of the establishment of the Southern Front in Nicaragua: =93The Contras
were desperate for resources. Without drug money their efforts would
certainly have failed.=94=20
The logic of having drug money pay for the pressing needs of the
Contras appealed to a number of people who became involved in the
covert war (against the possibility of successful socialism in
Nicaragua). Indeed, senior U.S. policy makers were not immune to the
idea that drug money was a perfect solution to the Contras=92 funding
problems. (If the Congress would not allow the Contras and the
struggle against communism to be funded legally, then other means
would have to be found. =91Communism=92 had to be stopped---no matter
what the price. The ends justified any means necessary.)
The initial Senate Committee investigation into the international drug
trade, which began in April, 1986, was precipitated by allegations
that Senator John F. Kerry had received, regarding illegal gun-running
and narcotics trafficking associated with the Contra war against
Nicaragua. This investigation attempted to discover the interaction
between foreign policy, narcotics trafficking, and law enforcement.
The investigation came to two conclusions: first that the supply
network of the Contras was used by drug traffickers, and secondly that
the Contras knowingly received financial and material assistance from
drug traffickers. In both cases, one or another agency of the U.S.
government had information regarding the involvement, either while it
was occurring or immediately thereafter.
- More specifically, this committee investigated:
1) The participation of narcotics traffickers in Contra supply
operations through business relationships with Contra organizations,
2) Provision of assistance to the Contras by narcotics traffickers,
including cash, weapons, planes, pilots, air supply services and other
materials, on a voluntary basis by the traffickers,
3) PAYMENTS TO DRUG TRAFFICKERS BY THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, using
funds authorized by Congress for humanitarian assistance to the
Contras, IN SOME CASES AFTER THE TRAFFICKERS HAD BEEN INDICTED BY
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES ON DRUG CHARGES, in others while
traffickers were under active investigation by these same agencies.
_____________________________________________________
On several thousand acres of land in northern Costa Rica, which were
owned by a number of Americans (one of whom was receiving $10,000 a
month in coke proceeds, by way of orders from Oliver North in the
Reagan White House.), there was constructed a rather elaborate
infrastructure, ostensibly for assisting the Contra Southern Front, in
Nicaragua, just to the north. Mainly it consisted of runways (6 of
them), hangars, housing, storage buildings, and airplane refueling
facilities. This infrastructure became increasingly important to the
drug traffickers, as this was the very period in which the cocaine
trade to the U.S. from Latin America was growing exponentially.
In the words of Karol Prado, an officer of the ARDE Contra
organization of Eden Pastora on the Southern Front, `drug traffickers
approached political groups like ARDE trying to make deals that would
somehow camouflage or cover up their activities.`
As DEA OFFICIALS TESTIFIED last July (1987) before the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on Crime, Lt. Col. Oliver North suggested to the DEA in
June 1985 that $1.5 million in drug money---carried aboard a plane
piloted by DEA informant Barry Seal and generated in a sting of the
Medellin Cartel and Sandinista officials---be given to the Contras.
While the suggestion was rejected by the DEA, the very fact that it
was made, highlights the utility and appeal of drug profits, among
those engaged in covert activity.
Costa Rican pilot Werner Lotz emphasized that Contra operations on the
Southern Front were in fact funded by drug operations. He testified
that weapons for the Contras came from Panama on small planes. The
pilots unloaded the weapons, refueled, and headed north towards the
U.S. with drugs. These pilots included Americans, Panamanians, and
Colombians, and occasionally uniformed members of the Panamanian
Defense Forces. Drug pilots soon began to use Contra airstrips to
refuel, even when there were no weapons to unload. They knew that the
authorities would not check the airstrips because the war was
`protected.`...
U.S. GOVERNMENT FUNDS GOING TO COMPANIES WITH=20
DRUG CONNECTIONS
To supply `humanitarian assistance` to the Contras, the (Reagan-Bush)
State Department selected four companies known to be owned and
operated by narcotic traffickers. The companies were:
- SETCO Air, a company established by Honduran drug trafficker
Ramon Matta Ballesteros;
- DIACSA, a Miami-based air company operated as the headquarters
of a drug trafficker enterprise for convicted drug traffickers =20
Floyd Carlton and Alfredo Caballero;
- FRIGORIFICOS DE PUNTERENNAS, a firm owned and operated=20
by Cuban-American drug traffickers;
- VORTEX, and air service and supply company partly owned by
admitted drug trafficker Michael Palmer.
In each case, PRIOR TO THE TIME THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT ENTERED INTO
CONTRACTS WITH THE COMPANY, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS HAD
RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT THE INDIVIDUALS CONTROLLING THESE COMPANIES
WERE INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS.
Officials at NHAO (Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Organization)
told GAO investigators that all the supply contractors were to have
been screened by U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies
_prior_ to receiving funds from State Department on behalf of the
Contras, to insure that they were not involved with criminal activity.
But neither the GAO nor the NHAO were certain whether this had
actually been done.
Consider the State Department`s first choice, SETCO. U.S. law
enforcement records clearly show that SETCO was established by
Honduran cocaine trafficker Juan Matta Ballesteros. A 1983 Customs
Investigative Report states that `SETCO (Services Ejectutivos Turistas
Commander) is headed by Juan Ramon Mata Ballestros, a class-I DEA
violator.` The same report states that, according to the Drug
Enforcement Agency, `SETCO aviation is a corporation formed by
American businessmen who are dealing with Matta and are smuggling
narcotics into the United States.`
One of the pilots SELECTED to fly Contra supply missions for SETCO was
Frank Moss, a man who has been under investigation as an alleged drug
trafficker since 1979. Moss has been investigated, though never
indicted, for narcotics offenses by ten (10) different law enforcement
agencies.=20
This Subcommittee received documentation that one Moss plane, a DC-4,
N90201, was used to move Contra goods from the United States to
Honduras. On the basis of information alleging that the plane was
being used for drug smuggling, on the return trips, the Customs
Service obtained a court order to place a concealed transponder on the
plane.
A second DC-4 controlled by Moss was chased off the west coast of
Florida by a Customs Service pursuit plane. Mid-air, the Moss DC-4
began dumping into the ocean, below, what appeared to be a large load
of drugs. When the plane landed at Port Charlotte no drugs were found
on board, but the plane`s registration was not in order and its last
known owners were drug traffickers. Law enforcement personnel also
found an address book aboard the plane, containing the telephone
numbers of some Contra officials and the Virginia telephone number of
Robert Owen, Oliver North`s courier and principal associate. Careful
inspection of the plane revealed the presence of significant marijuana
residue. The DEA seized the aircraft on March 16, 1987.
FRIGORIFICOS DE PUNTERENNAS
Frigorificos de Punterennas is a Costa Rican seafood company which was
created as a cover for the laundering of drug money. This according
to the grand jury testimony by one of its partners, as well as the
testimony by Ramon Milian Rodriguez, the convicted money launderer who
established the company.
From=20its inception, it was operated and owned by Luis Rodriguez of
Miami, Florida, and Carlos Soto and Ubaldo Fernandez---two convicted
drug traffickers. It`s main purpose and function was to launder drug
money. According to Massachusetts law enforcement officials, owner
Luis Rodriguez directed the largest marijuana smuggling ring in the
history of the state, and was indicted on drug trafficking charges by
the federal government on September 30, 1987 and on tax evasion in
connection with the laundering of money through Ocean Hunter on April
5, 1988.
**Luis Rodriguez** was also the person who controlled the bank account
held in the name of Frigorificos, WHICH RECEIVED $261,937 IN
`humanitarian assistance funds` FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN **1986**.
Rodriguez signed most of the orders to transfer the funds (for the
Contras) out of that account. Rodriguez was also president of Ocean
Hunter, an American seafood company created for him by Ramon Milian
Rodriguez. Ocean Hunter imported seafood it bought from Frigorificos
and used inter-company transactions to launder drug money.
Milian Rodriguez TOLD FEDERAL AUTHORITIES ABOUT **LUIS RODRIGUEZ`**
NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING PRIOR TO MILIAN RODRIGUEZ` ARREST IN MAY
**1983**. In March and April 1984, IRS AGENTS **INTERVIEWED** LUIS
RODRIGUEZ REGARDING OCEAN HUNTER, DRUG TRAFFICKING AND MONEY
LAUNDERING, and he took the Fifth Amendment in response to every
question. In September, 1984, Miami police officials advised the FBI
of information that Ocean Hunter was funding Contra activities through
`narcotics transactions,` and noted that Luis Rodriguez was its
president. This information confirmed previous accounts the FBI had
received concerning the involvement of Ocean Hunter (and its officers)
in Contra supply operations which involved the Cuban American
community.
DESPITE THE INFORMATION POSSESSED BY THE FBI, CUSTOMS AND OTHER LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, FULLY DOCUMENTING Luis Rodriguez` INVOLVEMENT IN
NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING AND MONEY LAUNDERING, the Reagan-Bush State
Department used Frigorificos, which Rodriguez owned and operated, to
deliver `humanitarian assistance` to the Contras in late 1985.
Official funds for the Contras (and the drug traffickers), from
American taxpayers, began to be deposited into the Frigorificos
account in early 1986, and continued until mid-1986.=20
In May 1986, Senator Kerry advised the Justice Department, the Drug
Enforcement Agency, the State Department, the NHAO and the CIA of
allegations he received that Luis Rodriguez (and his companies) were
involved in drug trafficking and money laundering. In August 1986,
the Foreign Relations Committee asked the Justice Department whether
the allegations about Luis Rodriguez were true, and requested
documents to determine whether the State Department might have in fact
provided funds to a company controlled by drug traffickers. However,
the (Reagan-Bush) JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REFUSED TO ANSWER THIS INQUIRY.
The indictment of Luis Rodriguez on drug charges 18 months later
demonstrated that the concerns raised by Senator Kerry to the Justice
Department and other agencies in May 1986 (concerning Rodriguez`
companies), were well founded. =20
The inescapable conclusion: THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT HAD, IN FACT,
KNOWINGLY CHOSEN COMPANIES OPERATED BY DRUG TRAFFICKERS TO SUPPLY THE
CONTRAS.
THE CURIOUS CASE OF JOHN HULL, PATRIOT
John Hull was a central figure in Contra operations on the Southern
Front of Nicaragua when these operations were being managed by Oliver
North, from 1984 through late 1986. Before that, according to former
Costa Rican CIA station chief Thomas Castillo`s public testimony, Hull
had helped the CIA with military supply and other operations on behalf
of the Contras. In addition, during the same period, at Oliver
North`s direction, Hull received $10,000 a month from Contra leader
Adolfo Calero, (ultimately paid for by America`s growing number of
coke and crack addicts).=20
Hull was an Indiana `farmer` who moved to northern Costa Rica in the
mid-1970`s and persuaded a number of North Americans to invest in
ranch land in the northern part of that country. Using their money
and adding some of his own, he purchased thousands of acres of Costa
Rican farm land just south of the Nicaraguan border. Properties under
his ownership, management or control ultimately included at least six
airstrips. To the many pilots and revolutionaries who passed through
the region, this collection of properties and airstrips became known
as John Hull`s ranch.
On March 23, 1984, seven men aboard a U.S. government-owned DC-3 were
killed when the cargo plane crashed near Hull`s ranch, revealing
publicly that Hull was allowing his property to be used for airdrops
of supplies to the Contras. But even before this public revelation of
Hull`s role in supporting the Contras, officials in a variety of Latin
American countries were aware of Hull`s activities as a liaison
between the Contras and the United States government. For example,
Jose Blandon testified that former Costa Rican Vice President Daniel
Oduber suggested that he (Blandon) meet with Hull as early as 1983, to
discuss the formation of a unified southern Contra command under Eden
Pastora.
Five witnesses have testified that Hull was involved in cocaine
trafficking: Floyd Carlton, Werner Lotz, Jose Blandon, George Morales,
and Gary Betzner. Betzner testified that he personally witnessed, in
Hull`s presence, cocaine being loaded onto planes headed for the
United States.
Hull became the subject of an investigation by the U.S. Attorney for
the Southern District of Florida in the spring of 1985. In late March
1985, Assistant U.S. Attorney Jeffrey Feldman and two FBI agents went
to Costa Rica to investigate neutrality Act violations by participants
in the Contra re-supply network that were also under investigation at
the time by Senator Kerry. Both the Feldman and Kerry inquiries had
been prompted in part by statements made to reporters by soldiers of
fortune imprisoned in Costa Rica, who alleged that John Hull was
providing support for the Contras with the help of the (Reagan-Bush)
National Security Council.
Feldman and the FBI agents met with U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica,
Lewis Tambs, and the CIA Chief of Station, Thomas Castillo, who told
him (Feldman) that John Hull knew Rob Owen and Oliver North. Castillo
gave the impression that Hull had been working for U.S. interests
prior to March of 1984. In addition, one of the embassy security
officers, Jim Nagel, told one of the FBI agents accompanying Feldman
that, regarding Feldman`s inquiries, `...these are agencies with
other operational requirements and (you) shouldn`t interfere with the
work of these agencies.` When Feldman attempted to interview Hull, he
learned that Hull had been told by the embassy staff not to talk to
him unless he (Hull) was accompanied by an attorney. Not
surprisingly, Feldman concluded that U.S. Embassy officials in Costa
Rica were taking active measures to protect Hull. (It would not be
the first time that a U.S. Embassy was managed and staffed by the
CIA).
@@@
881200, Washington, DC.
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 1996 07:44:33 -0800
From: mregen@ix.netcom.com (Marnie Regen )
To: DRCTalk@drcnet.org
Subject: Narcotics and the North Notebooks
Message-ID: <199601101544.HAA19095@IX5.IX.NETCOM.COM>
Caught this on usenet, thought some might be interested:
-----------------------------------------------------------
DRUGS, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND FOREIGN POLICY: A REPORT
-----------------------------------------------------------
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations of
the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. December
1988.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Washington : U.S. G.P.O. : For sale the U.S. G.P.O., Supt. of Docs.,
April 13, 1989.
-----------------------------------------------------------
GOV DOC # Y 4.F 76/2:S.prt.100-165.
-----------------------------------------------------------
>From pp. 145-147.
APPENDIX: NARCOTICS AND THE NORTH NOTEBOOKS
SUMMARY
Among the voluminous testimony and documents received by the
Iran/Contra Committee was a significant amount of material relevant
to matters under investigation by the Subcommittee on Narcotics,
Terrorism, and International Operations.
In early 1987, the Subcommittee Chairman, Senator John F. Kerry
and Senator Daniel K. Inouye, the chairman of the Senate Select
Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan
Opposition, worked out an agreement under which staff assigned to
the Subcommittee would receive the necessary special security
clearances to study all of the documents to which the Iran/Contra
committees had access.
In November and December 1987, the cleared Committee staff read
thousands of pages of Iran/Contra Committee material including the
"North notebooks," which consisted of 2,848 pages of spiral-bound
notes taken by North on a daily basis from September, 1984 through
November, 1986 covering his activities, telephone calls and meetings
while he was at the National Security Council. In reviewing these
notebooks, the Committee staff found a number of references to
narcotics, terrorism and related matters which appeared relevant and
material to the Subcommittee's inquiry. However, in many of these
cases, material in the Notebooks adjacent to the narcotics references
has been deleted from the material provided to the Committee.
Upon reviewing the matter with staff of the Iran/Contra Committees,
the Subcommittee learned that neither the Iran/Contra Committees nor
the White House had had access to uncensored North Notebooks. Instead,
North or his attorney had deleted portions of the Notebooks which they
considered to be outside of he jurisdiction of the of the Iran-Contra
Committees. In all, 1,269 of the pages of the Notebooks were
censored to some extent by North or his attorneys prior to being
delivered to the Iran/Contra Committees, with 155 pages blacked out
completely.
This occurred because North took the Notebooks from the White House
in November 1986 before his documents were impounded, and turned them
over to his lawyer, Brendon Sullivan. The Notebooks were then
subpoenaed
by the Iran/Contra Committees. North asserted his Fifth Amendment
Constitutional right, and was then given limited immunity by the
Committees to compel his testimony. After North was given immunity,
his attorneys still objected to furnishing the full Notebooks,
contending that they were not relevant to the Committee's investigation
and North need only furnish portions which he and his attorneys
determined were relevant.
Because of the Iran/Contra Committee's very tight deadlines and the
need to have the Notebooks for at least a brief period prior to
beginning the questioning of North, the Committee agreed to allow
North's lawyers to make deletions from the Notebooks. North or his
attorneys blacked out hundreds of Notebook pages and numerous entries.
Some of the censored entries were read by Committee lawyers, but most
were not. Most important, the lawyers who read the diaries at that time
did not know names, dates and places which would later prove to be
important, and therefore were not in a position to determine the
relevance of the material deleted.
The Iran/Contra Committee's staff had only a few days to review
the material before North was questioned. The thousands of pages were
furnished in often illegible copies and would have taken weeks of
analysis to make sense of under the best of conditions.
Under a fundamental agreement over classification which the
Iran/Contra Committees made with White House, the Notebooks were
classified at codeword level and could only be released after a
review by a White House declassification team.
Following the review of the diary entries by cleared staff,
Senator Kerry read several hundred pages of the North Notebooks and
wrote the White House on January 25, 1988 requesting the immediate
declassification of 543 pages containing references to drugs and drug
trafficking, North's probe of the investigation into North's
activities initiated by the Foreign Relations Committee in 1986,
and related matters.
A White House declassification team declassified some of the
requested materials. Some of the materials were deemed "not relevant to
the investigation," and others were not declassified because the White
House team could not determine what they meant without reading portions
not in their possession since they had been previously censored by
North and his attorneys. The White House did not declassify 104 of the
pages requested by the Committee staff, contending that all further
declassifications would have to await the processing of materials
necessary for Independent Counsel Walsh in connection with the
prosecution of Admiral John Poindexter, Albert Hakim and Richard Secord
for alleged criminal activity in connection with their roles in the
Iran/Contra affair.
When the Committee staff discussed the problem posed by the high
classifications given the materials within the North notebooks, White
House Counsel A.B. Culvahouse said the White House considered the
Notebooks the property of the federal government and subject to
classification at the highest levels.
The Subcommittee chairman, Senator Kerry, wrote the White House to
state that if the Notebooks were as sensitive as the White use
contended, they should not be allowed to remain in the possession of
either North,whose clearances had been terminated and who remained
under indictment,or in the hands of his attorneys, who cannot be
cleared to the codeword level. While reiterating that it considered the
materials to be highly classified, the White House took no steps to
secure the materials it contended remained federal property.
COMMITTEE ACTION
On April 26, 1988, the Committee voted 17-1 to approve a subpoena
for the full North Notebooks. The subpoena was served on Lt. Colonel
North.On May 10, 1988, North's attorney, Brendon V. Sullivan, Jr.,
appeared before a Committee hearing called for the purpose of receiving
the subpoenaed materials. Sullivan provided no materials and asserted
North's Fifth Amendment privilege. He further asked the Committee to
rescind the subpoena on the grounds that its issuance would jeopardize
North's right to a fair trial, and that the material requested was
beyond the jurisdiction of the Foreign Relations Committee. After
receiving legal advice from the Office of the Senate Legal Counsel, the
Committee voted 10-8 to enforce the subpoena on September 14, 1988, but
was unable to secure the materials prior to the end of the 100th
Congress.
CASE STUDY: THE DRUG-RELATED ENTRIES
Because of the extensive deletions in the Notebooks made first by
North and his attorneys and secondly by the White House, it is
difficult to gauge from the non-classified materials of the Notebooks
the full extent to which the Notebooks relate to terrorism or narcotics
trafficking, the areas of the Subcommittee's direct jurisdiction.
However, even in their highly incomplete state, the Notebooks do
contain numerous references to drugs, terrorism, and to the attempts of
the Committee itself to investigate what North was doing in connection
with his secret support of the Contras.
Among the entries in the North Notebooks which discernably concern
narcotics or terrorism are:
May 12, 1984. ... contract indicates that Gustavo is involved
w/drugs (Q0266)
June 26, 1984. DEA - (followed by two blocks of text deleted
by North) (Q0349)
June 27, 1984. Drug Case - DEA program on controlling cocaine -
Ether cutoff - Colombians readjusting - possible
negotiations to move refining effort to Nicaragua -
Pablo Escobar - Colombian drug czar - Informant
(Pilot) is indicted criminal - Carlos Ledher -
Freddy Vaughn (Q0354)
July 9, 1984. Call from Clarridge - Call Michael re Narco Issue -
RIG at 1000 Tommorrow (Q0384) - DEA Miami - Pilot
went talked to Vaughn - wanted A/C to go to Bolivia
to p/u paste - want A/C to p/u 1500 kilos - Bud to
meet w/Group (Q385)
July 12, 1984. Gen Gorman - *Include Drug Case (Q0400) Call from
Johnstone - (White House deletion) leak on Drug
(0402)July 17, 1984. Call to Frank M - Bud Mullins Re
leak on DEA piece -Carlton Turner (Q0418)
Call from Johnstone -
McManus, LA Times-says/NSC source claims W.H. has
pictures of Borge loading cocaine in Nic. (Q0416)
July 20, 1984. Call from Clarridge - Alfredo Cesar Re
Drugs-Borge/Owen leave Hull alone (Deletions)
/Los Brasiles Air Field-
Owen off Hull (Q0426)
July 27, 1984. Clarridge: - (Block of White House
deleted text follows)
- Arturo Cruz, Jr. - Get Alfredo Cesar on Drugs
(Q0450)
July 31, 1984. - Finance: Libya - Cuba/Bloc Countries - Drugs ...
Pablo Escobar/Frederic Vaughn (Q0460)
July 31, 1984. Staff queries re (White House deletion) role in DEA
operations in Nicaragua (Q0461)
Dec. 21, 1984. Call from Clarridge: Ferch (White House deletion) -
Tambs-Costa Rica - Felix Rodriguez close to (White
House
deletion) - not assoc. W/Villoldo - Bay of Pigs - No
drugs (Q0922)
Jan. 14, 1985. Rob Owen - John Hull - no drug connection -
Believes (Q0977)
July 12, 1985. $14 million to finance came from drugs (Q1039)
Aug. 10, 1985. Mtg. w/A.C. - name of DEA person in New Orleans re
Bust on Mario/DC-6 (Q1140)
Feb. 27, 1986. Mtg. w/Lew Tamb- DEA Auction A/C seized as drug
runners. - $250-260K fee (Q2027)
Numerous other entries contain references to individuals or events
which Subcommittee staff has determined to have relevance to narcotics,
terrorism, or international operations, but whose ambiguities cannot
be resolved without the production of the deleted materials by North
and his attorneys.
Accordingly, the Subcommittee continues to believe that the
production of the deleted material could shed important light on a
number of important issues in connection with foreign policy, law
enforcement and narcotics and terrorism. The Chairman of the
Subcommittee will urge that further steps be taken to secure the
original North notebooks in an uncensored form.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 22 Jan 1996 20:14:59 -0800
From: mregen@ix.netcom.com (Marnie Regen )
To: DRCTalk@drcnet.org
Subject: Oliver North and the CIA/DEA "sting" (2/3) (long)
Message-ID: <199601230414.UAA20346@IX.IX.NETCOM.COM>
---- Begin Forwarded Message
Newsgroups: misc.activism.progressive
Subject: MENA: Oliver North, Barry Seal, and the CIA/DEA "sting" (2/3)
Date: 22 Jan 1996 23:54:23 GMT
-----------------------------------------------------------
ENFORCEMENT OF NARCOTICS, FIREARMS, AND MONEY
LAUNDERING LAWS:
-----------------------------------------------------------
Oversight Hearings before the Subcommittee on Crime of the
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives,
One Hundredth Congress, Second Session, July 28,
September 23, 29, and October 5, 1988.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Washington : U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the U.S. G.P.O.,
Supt. of Docs., Congressional Sales Office, 1989.
---------------------------------------------------------
GOV DOC # Y 4.J 89/1:100/138
-----------------------------------------------------------
The following testimony is from pp. 56-67, 72, 74-78.
The persons asking the questions are:
Congressman William J. Hughes, Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Crime of the House Judiciary Committee.
Congressman Bill McCollum
Excerpts from Oversight Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Crime of the House Judiciary Committee
ENFORCEMENT OF NARCOTICS, FIREARMS,
AND MONEY LAUNDERING LAWS
Thursday, July 28, 1988
TESTIMONY OF RON CAFFREY, CHIEF OF THE COCAINE DESK IN 1984,
DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY [DEA], U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; FRANK
MONASTERO, FORMER ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, DEA; AND DAVE WESTRATE,
ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, DEA
Mr. CAFFREY. I have been a field agent, supervisor, middle
management, special agent in charge. I have held various positions at
the headquarters level in our Office of Inspection, Chief of our
Domestic Enforcement, and Chief of our Cocaine Section.
Mr. HUGHES. Are you still Chief of our Cocaine Section?
Mr. CAFFREY. Special Agent in Charge in Atlanta, Georgia?
Mr. HUGHES. As Chief of the Cocaine Desk, DEA Headquarters, when did
you first become aware of the Seal Nicaragua case?
Mr. CAFFREY. In the Spring of 1984.
Mr. HUGHES. Did you have any personal involvement or are you aware
of the CIA being asked to assist the DEA?
Mr. CAFFREY. I am aware the CIA was involved with us, but
specifically to track down when that occurred. I couldn't do.
Mr. HUGHES. How did you first become aware of the case?
Mr. CAFFREY. In the early spring or late winter, the National
Narcotics Border Interdiction in Washington, D.C. referred Barry Seal
to one of my staff coordinators in Washington. Seal was interested in
cooperating with the government.
One of my staff coordinators, Frank White, interviewed him,
determined in fact there was a case on him in Florida, and he was
referred back to the Miami Division to cooperate with our office in
Miami.
Mr. HUGHES. At what point did the Seal Case become a case of major
interest to your section.
Mr. CAFFREY. When he commenced making airplane visits to Latin
America, Colombia and so forth, to bring drugs into the country.
Mr. HUGHES. Did DEA have information that supported Seal's reports
that the Ochoa organization may be moving from Colombia to Nicaragua
and other places?
Mr. CAFFREY. Independent of Seal, no. At that time my recollection
is that, the Colombian organization had suffered a number of setbacks
in the spring of '84 and they were diversifying their operations to
various places in Central America. But my recollection is that
Nicaragua really surfaced through Seal.
Mr. HUGHES. Can you explain for us what the impact of the tranquil
and difficult raid was in March of 1984?
Mr. CAFFREY. Approximately ten tons of cocaine were seized in the
Coquita Province, which is later labeled Tranquil Landia by the
Colombian National Police. The DEA furnished leads to the police that
resulted in those raids. While the availability of cocaine, the change
in the availability of cocaine was incremental as a result of that, I
think it did stir up some consternation among the trafficking groups.
That is surmise on my part or analysis, but they were concerned. They
felt out in the middle of the jungle they were safe and here one of
their major complexes was raided and seized.
Mr. HUGHES. But there is no question that that raid gave them great
deal of concern. Many of the top leaders in the Medellin cartel left
Colombia during that period of time?
Mr. CAFFREY. There were a series of events. That was one major
event. There was an assassination made on the Minister of Justice, I
believe subsequent to that, which placed a lot of law enforcement
response by the Colombian Government against the traffickers. So there
were a number of reasons why they were seeking other areas to operate
out of.
Mr. HUGHES. The assassination of the Justice Minister in particular
put a great deal of pressure on the organization?
Mr. CAFFREY. Yes.
Mr. HUGHES. Did DEA have any involvement in acquiring the C-123K air
transport used by Seal, which was described earlier by Mr. Jacobsen?
Mr. CAFFREY. I am not aware we were. I think we may have assisted in
paying for some retrofitting on it, but in terms of the acquisition of
the aircraft, I am not familiar with that.
Mr. HUGHES. But you did assist in retrofitting it at the Air Force
Base?
Mr. CAFFREY. We assisted financially with it. That was our function
in Washington. We didn't really - we were not operational line control
people. We were coordinators who supported investigations by gaining
authorities or by providing funding.
Mr. HUGHES. Who actually made the arrangements at DEA to have that
work done?
Mr. CAFFREY. I am not sure.
Mr. HUGHES. You didn't?
Mr. CAFFREY. I did not.
Mr. HUGHES. You did not participate in that?
Mr. MONASTERO. I did, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HUGHES. Okay. Did you provide any briefings to the White House,
National Security Council, the CIA, the Department of Justice, State
Department or others, other agencies prior to the time Seal left
Homestead Air Force Base to pick up the cocaine in Nicaragua?
Mr. CAFFREY. I don't recall that I did. I recall that I gave a
briefing after his return with the drugs and prior to his return with
the money. I gave that briefing - I don't know the specific date, but I
gave it to Oliver North of the National Security Council. A CIA person
by the name of Dewey - his first name is Dewey - and one other person.
Mr. HUGHES. We will get into that. But at that point you had not
conducted any briefings for anybody at the National Security Council or
State Department?
Mr. CAFFREY. I had not, no.
Mr. HUGHES. You had not. How were you advised of the results of
Seal's successful trip to pick up the cocaine?
Mr. CAFFREY. By the Miami Division. By the case agents in Miami who
were running the operation.
Mr. HUGHES. Was that by teletype?
Mr. CAFFREY. Probably by phone and by teletype.
Mr. HUGHES. Did you receive the photographs that ere returned on the
plane the same day Seal returned from Nicaragua? That would be about
the 26th of June of 1984.
Mr. CAFFREY. I don't recall the exact date when we got the photos,
but it was shortly after their return - the return from Nicaragua with
the drugs - that the photos were sent to me from Miami.
Mr. HUGHES. Had you received the photos from Miami before you were
asked to brief the National Security Council?
Mr. CAFFREY. Yes.
Mr. HUGHES. Who asked you to brief the NSC?
Mr. CAFFREY. I believe it was Mr. Westrate or Mr. Monastero or both.
Mr. HUGHES. What was the reason given for the briefing? Do you know
off hand?
Mr. CAFFREY. I don't know that they gave me a reason. I presume I
knew what the reason was at the time, to ensure that our investigation
was coordinated, since it was an investigation taking place in a
sensitive area where we did not have an office as we normally operate.
Mr. HUGHES. But after the C-123C returned from Nicaragua with a load
of cocaine, it was at that point, during that time frame, that you were
then requested to brief the NSC?
Mr. CAFFREY. Yes sir.
Mr. HUGHES. Shortly thereafter, within a few days?
Mr. CAFFREY. It occurred before the return trip on July the 7th. I
just can't pin down the exact date.
Mr. HUGHES. Did you know before you went to the briefing who was
going to be present?
Mr. CAFFREY. No sir.
Mr. HUGHES. Did you know what government agencies would be
represented?
Mr. CAFFREY. I knew representatives from the National Security
Agency would be there.
Mr. HUGHES. This was not a formal meeting of the NSC?
Mr. CAFFREY. No sir.
Mr. HUGHES. Just members from the NSC or staff?
Mr. CAFFREY. Yes sir.
Mr. HUGHES. Were you given any instructions prior to the briefing by
your superiors?
Mr. CAFFREY. No sir.
Mr. HUGHES. Were you told to withhold any information or restrict
details of any particular matters?
Mr. CAFFREY. No sir, just to show them the photographs and keep them
up - brief them up as to where we were at that particular point in time
in the investigation.
Mr. HUGHES. Tell us what took place at the initial briefing, where
it took place, and what took place, and who was present.
Mr. CAFFREY. It took place in the Executive Office Building. As I
say, it occurred somewhere between the 26th - the return with the drugs
- and July 7th and the departure. I went over to the building and
Oliver North was there with a person from the CIA by the name of Dewey
and another individual whose name escapes me. I don't recall who that
was. And I displayed the photographs that we had and pointed out some
of the defendants who were the picture. It was my sense of it, that
they were familiar with the investigation.
Mr. HUGHES. So you sensed they already had the photographs and knew
who was in the photographs?
Mr. CAFFREY. Yes. It was simply really we rehashed what our
intentions would be in the investigation in the future and I did most
of the talking in terms of the briefing, and during the course of it,
they were asking me questions.
Mr. HUGHES. What did you say to them during that briefing? Now
present apparently were Colonel North - Oliver North - with the
National Security Council, a man by the name of Dewey, who was with the
Central Intelligence Agency, yourself?
Mr. CAFFREY. There was also another person from the DEA with me, but
I am not exactly sure who it was. It may have been one of the staff
assistants for the front office.
Mr. HUGHES. It was just those three agencies who participated in the
briefing - DEA, CIA -
Mr. CAFFREY. There was also another individual that, as I say, I
couldn't identify. I don't know what his affiliation was.
Mr. HUGHES. What did you say during the briefing?
Mr. CAFFREY. Well, I brought them up to speed as to where we were
with the investigation in terms of the fact that the drugs were back in
the United States. This was a photograph of who was in the picture.
There were some questions asked of me what our intentions were
generally and I told them you know, generally what we were going to
attempt to do was to go back and pay for the drugs, that we had some
problems to work out with the U.S. Attorney's office, who was somewhat
hesitant about us going back, for justifiable reasons, but we felt it
was an operational decision that we would ultimately make in the DEA.
Mr. HUGHES. Did you describe to them the significance of this
operation?
Mr CAFFREY. Yes sir. They were very well aware of the significance
of it. In fact, the CIA representative, in pointing out Frederico
Vaughn in the photographs, I knew that Frederico Vaughn was a defendant
in a case, but frankly, I didn't really know he was, and the CIA
representative told me that he was an associate of a government
official, a Nicaraguan government official, which was news to me at the
time.
Mr. HUGHES. That is news to me too, because the CIA tells us they
don't know anything about him. But they understood the significance,
that we were talking about high level traffickers?
Mr. CAFFREY. Yes sir.
Mr. HUGHES. Escobar, Ochoa?
Mr. CAFFREY. Yes. The CIA had assisted us prior to my briefing of
them. They in fact assisted us in putting cameras on the aircraft.
Mr. HUGHES. What did they say. Who carried the conversation for the
other agencies?
Mr. CAFFREY. Most of the conversation was Colonel North.
Mr. HUGHES. Did he conduct the meeting as such?
Mr. CAFFREY. Yes sir.
Mr. HUGHES. What did he say during the meeting?
Mr. CAFFREY. Well, he asked our intentions as to whether we were
going to go back. He voiced his opinion that it was probably a
dangerous thing to send the informant back in, particularly in light of
the fact that at one point during this investigation the informant had
been shot down and incarcerated, so to speak, at the airport.
Colonel North asked me hypothetically if we were going to return
with the aircraft and the money, why we couldn't land the plane
somewhere outside of Nicaragua, outside the airport in Managua, and
maybe turn the money over to the contras.
I told him that was really out of the question because it would
jeopardize our informant. It was more a hypothetical question.
Mr. HUGHES. Oliver North was asking you if it was possible for you
to land the plane with the million and a half dollars outside of
Managua?
Mr. CAFFREY. If it was possible for Seal to land the plane.
Mr. HUGHES. Seal to land the plane outside of Managua so that the
money could be channeled to the contras?
Mr. CAFFREY. Yes sir.
Mr. HUGHES. And you told him that that was not possible, that would
jeopardize Barry Seal to begin with, and of course, that wouldn't be
proper anyway, would it?
Mr. CAFFREY. Right.
Mr. HUGHES. You indicated that Oliver North expressed some concern
about perhaps jeopardizing Barry Seal. Did Oliver North also suggest to
you any other reasons why that operation shouldn't go off as planned?
Mr. CAFFREY. No, but he did ask me when this investigation could go
public, when the information could be released, and I said certainly at
some point in time it would, but we had a lot of things to finish off
the investigation prior to that.
Mr. HUGHES. Isn't it a fact Oliver North wanted to go public then
and there with it?
Mr. CAFFREY. I don't recall that he suggested we go public. He asked
me if we could, or when we could actually, when we go.
Mr. HUGHES. Why did he say it was important to go public with it?
Mr. CAFFREY. He did indicate to me there was a vote coming up at
some point in time on an appropriations bill to fund the contras.
Mr. HUGHES. So he wanted too public because there was a contra aid
vote coming up before the Congress?
Mr. CAFFREY. Yes sir.
Mr. HUGHES. And he told you that?
Mr. CAFFREY. He mentioned it in a conversation.
Mr. HUGHES. And what did you say to him?
Mr. CAFFREY. I told him that public disclosures would probably be
made by the U.S. Attorney's Office at the proper time, but that we had
a number of things that we still had to do in the investigation,
namely, we had arrests to make and we had to pursue some - we had a lot
of goals left in the investigation, some of which we were going to have
to accomplish in a relatively short period of time.
Mr. HUGHES. Well, the fact of the matter is that Barry Seal had made
tremendous inroads into this Medellin cartel, had he not?
Mr. CAFFREY. Yes sir.
Mr. HUGHES. You were familiar with the fact that he was trusted. In
fact, to your knowledge, they suggested that they wanted to take him,
show him their assets, wanted to take him to the Yucatan Penninsula in
Mexico, and in fact, when it appeared in the press, in the Washington
Times, he was on his way?
Mr. CAFFREY. Well, some of that information developed subsequent to
my briefing with Colonel North, as I recall. We did know what his
capabilities were, but on the other hand, we recognized that we had
taken cocaine out of the country and had delivered it to defendants n
Miami, had arrested them. We had taken - we were about to go back with
money to make a payoff. There is not too many times we could do that,
and him to continue that way, but contemporaneous with that, we did
have these other goals in the investigation.
Mr. HUGHES. How long have you been with DEA?
Mr. CAFFREY. Twenty-four years.
Mr. HUGHES. In your 24 years do you ever recall a confidential
informant, an operative, working their way into those levels of a major
cartel?
Mr. CAFFREY. We have had a number of real good investigations but I
would say this was a top notch investigation.
Mr. HUGHES. Did you ever recall an opportunity to reach the kingpin
of a cartel all at one time, as Barry Seal was in this operation?
Mr. CAFFREY. From an operational standpoint. I don't recall any. We
have had a number of investigations that have resulted with potential
indictments against - historical conspiracies against -
Mr. HUGHES. The reason it was important for this operation to move
ahead was because that potential existed to learn much more about the
organization, about their assets?
Mr. CAFFREY. That was a goal, but one of the primary goals was
actually the arrest of the principals.
Mr. HUGHES. The arrest of Ochoa?
Mr. CAFFREY. Yes.
Mr. HUGHES. And Escobar, and you were close to them. In fact your
operative was with them, traveling with them, staying at their
residences and had worked his way into their confidence. So you were
very close to that operation?
Mr. CAFFREY. We were very close to the operation but we were also
our informant, Seal - was in a precarious position at the time in a
sense that they had begun to check him out. He had already delivered
cocaine back into the United States and people had been arrested
subsequent to the delivery of that. So I mean, we were not about to end
our investigation at that point, but we realized that we were on the
clock so to speak, in terms of trying to achieve the goals that we had
in the investigation....
Mr. HUGHES. Did you explain to Oliver North when he suggested that
this operation be released - to utilize the photographs, I presume that
were taken of the transfer of the narcotics in Managua to get that out
to the press - did you suggest to him that that could put Barry Seal at
risk?
Mr. CAFFREY. We didn't discuss putting the photographs out in the
press. What he asked is could the story be told in the press, that is,
the story about flying into Nicaragua and the government being
involved. We didn't discuss the photographs being released. That was
not discussed, as I recall.
Mr. HUGHES. What he wanted to get out was there was an instance
where Sandinistas were involved in drug running?
Mr. CAFFREY. Yes sir.
Mr. HUGHES. That was the principal interest?
Mr. CAFFREY. That wasn't his principal interest, but he wanted to
know
how long was the case going to go on, what else did we plan on doing,
and
so forth.
Mr. HUGHES. Had you been to the National Security Council to brief
them on any other drug operations?
Mr. CAFFREY. I had not.
Mr. HUGHES. Since then have you?
Mr. CAFFREY. I may have attended another meeting where I didn't
actually do the briefing but - and it was during this time frame - but
I
just can't recall.
Mr. HUGHES. Isn't it unusual for the NSC to be interested in law
enforcement operations?
Mr. CAFFREY. It is the first time in my experience.
Mr. HUGHES. You have been at DEA for 24 years. Is that the first
time
you had that experience?
Mr. CAFFREY. Well, we have worked with CIA overseas on occasion.
Mr. HUGHES. Any question in your mind that the reason that Oliver
North was interested was because it was Sandinistas involving drug
trafficking.
Mr. CAFFREY. He was concerned about that.
Mr. HUGHES. An entry in Oliver North's notebook dated June 27 - I am
going to ask one of our staff to put it up - lists some topics under
the
heading "drug case." I want to direct your attention to this document.
Do
you recognize some of the topics? Can you read that?
Mr. CAFFREY. It contains the names of some of the defendants in the
case but the actual date really doesn't have much significance.
Mr. HUGHES. It has no significance?
Mr. CAFFREY. Not to me it doesn't, no.
Mr. HUGHES. But you did discuss the DEA program of controlling
cocaine?
Mr. CAFFREY. I beg your pardon?
Mr. HUGHES. You did discuss the DEA program of controlling cocaine?
Mr. CAFFREY. I did?
Mr. HUGHES. I am asking the question. I don't know.
Mr. CAFFREY. In my conversation with North, and I don't believe it
was
on the 27th -
Mr. HUGHES. When do you think it was?
Mr. CAFFREY. I think it was after that.
Mr. WESTRATE. Mr. Chairman, I think that relates to a brief I had on
the 27th.
Mr. HUGHES. I see. Are there any other matters discussed with Oliver
North and this person Dewey? I presume you are referring to Dewey
Clarridge. Any other discussions at that meeting?
Mr. CAFFREY. No. The meeting ended just with what I thought was the
general understanding that we were probably going to go back with the
money. We had not really finalized that plan yet. We had to get
permission from our boss, but that was how I left off the meeting.
Mr. HUGHES. How many times did Oliver North suggest to you that the
operation should be aborted and go public with it?
Mr. CAFFREY. I don't know that he said it should be aborted
necessarily. He didn't think it was a good idea that the informant
should
go back down there. I seem to recall that after that meeting, I had a
conversation with him. I don't know whether it was on the phone or
whether I actually went over and talked to him, but when we in fact had
decided that we were going to go back and make the payment with the
money, and he expressed surprise that we were going back, which
indicated maybe we had some misunderstanding the previous time, that he
thought we weren't. But all I really left off with him previously was
we
hadn't made a final decision to go back yet, but probably we would go
back.
Mr. HUGHES. How many times did Oliver North indicate to you that he
felt that you ought to go public with it because of the contra vote
coming up?
Mr. CAFFREY. He just mentioned that one time during the course of
our
briefing. As I say, I was doing the briefing, so I was doing most of
the
talking, and some of the questions he posed -
Mr. HUGHES. Did you report or tell your superiors about Oliver
North's
suggestion that the plane be landed in another country besides
Nicaragua
and divert the $1.5 million to the Contras?
Mr. CAFFREY. I am not sure that I did that. My conversations when I
came back really related more to the possible publicity, possible -
that
there were a number of people now more conversant with the case. I
think
my concerns were more in that area.
Mr. HUGHES. Did you have any other briefings with the National
Security Council after that?
Mr. CAFFREY. Did I?
Mr. HUGHES. Yes.
Mr. CAFFREY. I don't recall that I had, but it is possible that I
may
have attended another meeting, but I just - I remember the one
specifically prior to the trip back with the money, because I was
conducting the briefing. I may have been in another one, attended one
with someone else who was really running the meeting, but off hand, I
don't recall.
Mr. HUGHES. Did there come a time when you learned that the
operation
was compromised and the media had it, had the story?
Mr. CAFFREY. Yes. That was the middle of July. I am not all that
conversant with that aspect of it, but there was a story that was
coming
out in the papers.
Mr. HUGHES. Did you find out about it before the story came out?
Mr. CAFFREY. I did not, but I believe somebody else in DEA did.
Mr. HUGHES. Did you ever conduct an investigation of the source of
the
leaks?
Mr. CAFFREY. I did not personally, no.
Mr HUGHES. Did you participate in any meetings where that suggestion
was made?
Mr. CAFFREY. I don't recall that I did, no.
Mr. HUGHES. Once the story was out to the Washington Times, then the
operation was clearly exposed?
Mr. CAFFREY. Yes. Seal's viability operationally was over. He was
now
a witness and not an operator.
Mr. HUGHES. So there is no question that he was of no further use as
an operator, as a confidential informant at that point?
Mr. CAFFREY. No. His utility after that would be as a witness.
Mr. HUGHES. When that story broke was Seal in this country?
Mr. CAFFREY. I am not sure where he was.
Mr. HUGHES. You don't have any personal knowledge?
Mr. CAFFREY. I am sure the case agents knew where he was.
Mr. McCOLLUM. I am trying to get a clarification. I wanted to know
if
he was asking the whole panel or just you, Mr. Caffrey. I think we are
doing it one at a time even though we have a panel. I think will do it
that way. Mr. Caffrey, how long did this briefing last with Colonel
North?
Mr. CAFFREY. About an hour.
Mr. McCOLLUM. It was a briefing that you gave to him, and the CIA
also
participated in the actual briefing.
Mr. CAFFREY. Yes, sir.
Mr. McCOLLUM. This was at his request?
Mr. CAFFREY. On whose request - my boss told me to go over and give
him a briefing, so this is what I did.
Mr. McCOLLUM. There was no indication from North as to how he
happened
to be aware of this to ask for a briefing o to be given one or anything
like that?
Mr. CAFFREY. No, but I gave him the briefing. They were pretty
conversant with the operation.
Mr. McCOLLUM. There has been an implication in earlier testimony
that
a White House aide, I suppose the implication is that it might be
North,
was the one who leaked this story to the press. You have told us about
the briefing. You told us that North would like to have - at one point
indicated he would like to have had this information released or the
story available. Do you have any actual knowledge that Oliver North or
anyone at the National Security Council did in fact leak this
information
to the press?
Mr. CAFFREY. No, I don't. I don't know who leaked it. I just know I
didn't leak it.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Understood. That is fair enough. In the process of an
investigation involving informants like this, Mr. Caffrey, where you
got
somebody such as Barry Seal involved, you go through using him for a
period of time, what makes this witness credible or not to you, what
makes this informant credible?
Mr. CAFFREY. When he tells us something that we are able to
corroborate through physical evidence or intelligence or through other
witnesses or other informants or from observations made by our agents.
Mr. McCOLLUM. And it was on this basis that you decided to use Barry
Seal because that type of information had come forward.
Mr. CAFFREY. Yes, sir, plus he was a pilot, a desirable commodity
for
smugglers.
Mr. McCOLLUM. How did you first get involved in this yourself? I
know
you were here in the Washington office. Is this routine for you to
oversee, or was this a special kind of a case because of the nature of
it
or how did it come to your attention to begin with
Mr. CAFFREY. There is a cocaine section we functionalize in the DEA,
cocaine and heroin section. It is our responsibility in our section to
monitor and coordinate most of the high caliber cocaine cases. We don't
supervise the cases or conduct the investigation. That is done in the
field level. But where there is special emphasis needed, if there is
extra recourses required, or special authorities like foreign travel,
things of that nature, or some investigation of a sensitive nature, we
would be more conversant with those cases than we would be with the run
of the mill street cases. That was our function that we had staff
coordinators responsible for various geographical areas of the world.
Mr. McCOLLUM. You were responsible for this area.
Mr. CAFFREY. I was responsible for all cocaine and I had staff,
about
eight or nine staff coordinators at the time working for me who had
responsibility, one of whom had responsibility for this case.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Who had that responsibility.
Mr. CAFFREY. I believe it was Frank White.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Would you have had any direct contact with Mr.
Jacobsen
who was the agent out in the field that we had as a witness this
morning.
Mr. CAFFREY. I don't believe so. I am not saying that that doesn't
happen but I don't recall that in the investigation I had any contact
with him. I think I had most of my contacts with Miami and with the
special agent in charge.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Who was?
Mr. CAFFREY. Mr. Joura.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Some of the contacts go through Mr. White because he
was
directly -
Mr. CAFFREY. Mr. White would be the person that handled a lot of the
details, requirements, if they needed money or equipment or special
authorities.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Who would you report to in your chain of command at
that
time.
Mr. CAFFREY. Mr. Westrate.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Who directed you to give the briefing to Ollie North?
Mr. CAFFREY. I believe Mr. Westrate....
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. Monastero, if I might, you are now retired from the
Drug Enforcement Administration.
Mr. MONASTERO. That is correct.
Mr. HUGHES. How many years did you serve with the DEA?
Mr. MONASTERO. I served the entire time DEA was formed 1973, with
the
prior agency and the agency prior to that.
Mr. HUGHES. When did you retire from DEA?
Mr. MONASTERO. June 30 of 1985.
Mr. HUGHES. What was your position at that time?
Mr. MONASTERO. I was the Chief of Operations, the Assistant
Administrator for Operations.
Mr. HUGHES. Assistant Administrator for Operations.
Mr. MONASTERO. Yes.
Mr. HUGHES. Actually, you were in charge of all operations.
Mr. MONASTERO. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. HUGHES. Worldwide.
Mr. MONASTERO. Yes....
Mr. HUGHES. Did you participate in any meetings at the National
Security Council?
Mr. MONASTERO. I did not.
Mr. HUGHES. You did not. Did you appear with - did you go to any
meetings where the leak was discussed, where you were attempting to do
something about the leak?
Mr. MONASTERO. Go to any meetings?
Mr. HUGHES. Yes. Did you attempt to do something about the
Mr. MONASTERO. Well, I went to a meeting on the 17th of July, the
day
that the leak or that the first press, direct press information
appeared
in the press. I was asked to go to brief Carlton Turner, who was the
Drug
Policy Advisor at the White House, on the investigation.
At that meeting, there was a discussion of the investigation and of
the leak at that time.
Mr. HUGHES. Was there an investigation underway to try to identify
the
source of the leak?
Mr. MONASTERO. There was no investigation of the leak at that time,
no.
Mr. HUGHES. Did you as Carlton Turner if he had any knowledge about
the leak?
Mr. MONASTERO. The recollection that I have of the meeting was to
the
effect that he asked me about the investigation and the leak. It was
obvious from our conversation that he had considerable amount of
information about the investigation. The inference that I drew from
some
of what he said was that he was accusing us, accusing DEA, of leaking
the
story. I became quite irritated with that, got quite upset, and let him
know in no uncertain terms, as I
recall, that I thought the leak came from the White House, because of
the
contra support vote that was upcoming and that we had no intention of
leaking the story.
That, as a matter of fact, if whoever did leak it would have waited
just a little bit longer, they would have had more incriminating
information about what involvement the Sandinista Government, in fact,
may have had in that case.
Mr. HUGHES. Is that the first time with the Barry Seal, Nicaragua
case
that you were privy to any information that the Nicaraguans,
Sandinistas
or anybody else in Nicaragua was trafficking in drugs?
Mr. MONASTERO. The Barry Seal case?
Mr. HUGHES. Yes.
Mr. MONASTERO. As far as I can recall, yes.
Mr. HUGHES. Do you recall after that case any information coming to
your attention involving he Sandinistas, drug trafficking?
Mr. MONASTERO. No.
Mr. HUGHES. So that was the only instance?
Mr. MONASTERO. To my recollection, it was, yes.
Mr. HUGHES. Did you become aware of the suggestion that was made
apparently by Oliver North to Mr. Caffrey that perhaps playing with the
$1.1 million which might be sent down in another country, where the
money
could be channeled to the contras?
Mr. MONASTERO. I think Mr. Caffrey said it would land outside of
Managua, but in Nicaragua, but, no, I don't have any recollection of
being told that at the time, and, frankly, if he did tell me, I
wouldn't
at that time have realized the significance of that.
Mr. HUGHES. You would not have realized it?
Mr. MONASTERO. I wouldn't have realized it at that time because
nobody
knew that Oliver North was doing what he was doing.
Mr. HUGHES. I see....
Mr. HUGHES. To your knowledge, who had the information about the
operation beside DEA?
Mr. MONASTERO. To my knowledge, certain people, and I can't go
through
a litany of names, at the White House knew about it. People at the CIA
certainly knew about it. There were people in the Defense Department,
although I think, well, there were people in the Defense Department who
knew about it.
There may have been people in other agencies that I am not aware of
that may have known about it. But those agencies certainly besides DEA
knew about the investigation.
Mr. HUGHES. Did you participate in any of the discussions with (IA
at
any point when they were attempting to release the information, when
they
were trying to get it released publicly?
Mr. MONASTERO. l am not aware that the CIA was ever - I heard the
testimony this morning. That is the first time I heard that.
Mr. HUGHES. You have no knowledge of that, though?
Mr. MONASTERO. Not the CIA, no.
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. Westrate, you are presently with the DEA, are you
not?
Mr. WESTRATE. I am currently the Assistant Administrator for
Operations.
Mr. HUGHES. What was your position in May and June and July of 1984?
Mr. WESTRATE. Mr. Monastero's deputy, so I was a Deputy Assistant
for
Operations.
Mr. HUGHES. Deputy Assistant for Operations?
Mr. WESTRATE. Yes, sir.
Mr. HUGHES. Did there come a time when you became aware of the Barry
Seal operation?
Mr. WESTRATE. Yes, sir, during the same time frame, May, June, and
July of 1984.
Mr. HUGHES. HOW did you become aware of it?
Mr. WESTRATE. Through the normal course of business.
Mr. HUGHES. Were you the contact person in operations?
Mr. WESTRATE. Well, I supervised all of the drug desks, so I was the
natural conduit between the drug desk and Mr. Monastero.
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. Caffrey reported directly to you?
Mr. WESTRATE. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Mr. HUGHES. You were aware from the very beginning that it was
brought
to the - that Barry Seal was brought to your attention?
Mr. WESTRATE. Well, I don't think necessarily the minute he was
debriefed because as we developed into the potential of actually making
a
trip to Nicaragua I was certainly brought in because that was very
sensitive.
Mr. HUGHES. What was your role during that period of time?
Mr. WESTRATE. My role was normal supervision, coordination down with
Mr. Caffrey, up with Mr. Monastero and some interaction activities.
Mr. HUGHES. Did you attend any briefings at the National Security
Council?
Mr. WESTRATE. Yes, sir, I did. I attended two meetings at the White
House. One on June 27th and a second one on June 29th.
Mr. HUGHES. Who was present at the meeting on June 27th?
Mr. WESTRATE. On June 27, there was myself, Colonel North, Mr. Dewey
Clarridge of the CIA, Kennedy Grafanrid, who was, as I understood,
assistant to the President and Greg Johnstone of the Office of Indian
Affairs at the State Department.
Mr. HUGHES. Who conducted the meeting?
Mr. WESTRATE. Colonel North.
Mr. HUGHES. What was discussed at the meeting?
Mr. WESTRATE. There were a number of issues discussed at the
meeting.
The meeting opened with a presentation of the photographs by Mr.
Clarridge. The photos were passed around the room and discussed. The
second thing that we discussed was whether or not to release, the
release
of the facts in this case would in any way influence the pending vote
on
the Congress. And interestingly enough the conclusion of the group was
that it probably, in the end, would not.
We also discussed at some length the rules about press releases in
cases. most of which I led, because I wanted to make certain that
everybody understood that there was within the criminal justice
system a very strict protocol on media coverage of investigations, and
we
were quite concerned that - I wanted to be certain nothing happened in
this case that would be different from another case, because clearly we
expected to be prosecuting some of the most major cocaine traffickers
in
the world, and didn't want to prejudice the prosecution.
So I explained at length the Department of Justice rules and how
generally we don't comment beyond as is often said the four corners of
an
indictment and so forth. There also was some discussion about how
details
of an investigation would or could come out and my objection was that
something as high visibility as this, in my view, having watched cases
over the years, that if the regular announcement were made, the media,
as
strong as it is, probably within a few days would elaborate
considerably.
That just seems to be the way things go. So we discussed that. And
we
also discussed at length the future, the potential that we felt that
this
investigation had. This meeting was the day after the cocaine had
arrived
in Miami, so the thing was really cooking at that point.
That meeting lasted quite awhile. And Friday, June 29, we attended -
Mr. HUGHES. Before you move on to the 29th of June, what prompted
the
discussion about the operation and how that would impact the contras?
Who
raised that issue?
Mr. WESTRATE. I don't remember who actually raised that.
Mr. HUGHES. What relevance would that have to this investigation?
What
difference does it make?
Mr. WESTRATE. I think it was quite clear, Mr. Chairman, that the
people at the White House felt that having derogatory information on
members of the Sandinista government would be helpful in this vote.
Mr. HUGHES. As a law enforcement officer, it wouldn't make any
difference to you what the politics were about the individuals, would
it?
Mr. WESTRATE. No, sir, it would not.
Mr. HUGHES. Obviously it was raised by somebody from the White
House?
Mr. WESTRATE. Yes, because they clearly were interested in this.
Mr. HUGHES. You didn't raise it, did you?
Mr. WESTRATE. No, I did not. That doesn't mean they wanted to
disclose
it prematurely but they were certainly interested in as soon as
possible.
This would be useful was the general tone of it. I wasn't sure it would
be useful. More cocaine traffickers, there are so many everywhere that
we
weren't sure they would have any impact at all. There was quite a
discussion on that very subject.
Mr. HUGHES. What precipitated your discussion with them concerning
the
rules of the Justice Department with regard to releasing information
and
the extent of the operation, nature of the operation, was it a
discussion
that perhaps it might be released in connection with an upcoming contra
vote?
Mr. WESTRATE. I think there were some assumptions made by people
there
who were not familiar with the investigative process in handling the
press about cases, that all the details could be disclosed including
photographs and, you know, other things that would normally in my
context
be evidentiary or perhaps grand jury information, or be, you know,
speculative or what have you, which we don't do in the investigative
process, press releases.
Mr. HUGHES. Was that, did that discussion come from Dewey Clarridge
or
from Oliver North or where did it come from?
Mr. WESTRATE. I really don't recall, sir. It was four years ago and
-Mr. HUGHES. Mr. Caffrey's recollection was it came from Oliver North.
You have information to that fact or to contradict that?
Mr. WESTRATE. It may have. I don't recall specifically.
Mr. HUGHES. The meeting of the 29th, who was present at that meeting
and what was discussed?
Mr. WESTRATE. At that meeting, Mr. Caffrey was present. He and I
went there, according to my notes, Mr. Clarridge, Mr. North, and again,
Mr. Johnstone. The purpose of this meeting was to just keep everybody
up to date and also to report the fact that the cocaine had actually
now been delivered and the seizure played in Miami. Again to reiterate
the fact that we had future plans and we were going to proceed with our
future plans.
Mr. HUGHES. Had you been to the White House, on the operation, like
on-going operations such as this before?
Mr. WESTRATE. Not on this particular thing, but I have been there a
couple times since on very sensitive cases.
Mr. HUGHES. That is the exception rather than the rule, is it?
Mr. WESTRATE. Yes, it is.
---- End Forwarded Message
------------------------------
@@@
890803, St Louis, MO, Matt Elrod. Marijuana claims another
Date: Sun, 17 Dec 1995 08:09:14 -0800
From: Creator@IslandNet.com (Matt Elrod)
To: drctalk@drcnet.org
Subject: Re: St Louis radio interview
Message-ID:
Phil wrote:
}Killing the 10 percent of the population that uses/traffics in
}illegal drugs would cost trillions of dollars to carry out. Because
}illegal drug use is most prevalent among young adults, the same group
}that is most likely to be gainful employed and raising families ...
Strange that after calling for the death penalty for smugglers Newt
said:
"As a further solution to the underclass problem, he said, ''The
second thing you have to do, frankly, is reestablish the strength of
the family ...
I'm not talking about some return to a Norman Rockwell, Puritan
environment or whatever the exaggeration of this comment will
lead to.
``But I am saying to all of you something that Pat Moynihan
said in 1965, which is a society in which young males grow up
without authority structures and without authority figures is a
society that is asking for destruction and chaos.''
At 5 a.m. on August 3, 1989, police came to the home of Bruce Lavoie,
34, a machinist with a wife and three children. Without announcing
themselves and with no evidence that Lavoie was armed, police smashed
the door in with a battering ram. They had a search warrant based on
an informant's tip that was 20 months old. As he arose from his bed,
Lavoie was shot to death as his son watched. A single marijuana
cigarette was found.
A single-parent family was left behind.
Matt.
------------------------------
@@@
900428, Costa Rica, The Orange County Register. Costa Rica is
The following article was originally printed in the Saturday, April 28,
1990 issue of *The Orange County Register* on page A18.
COSTA RICA MAY BAN IRAN-CONTRA FIGURES
Legislature blames scandal for increasing nation's drug traffic
Reuters
SAN JOSE, Costa Rica - The Costa Rican Legislative Assembly
recommended permanently banning former US officials involved in
the Iran-contra affair from entering the nation, saying the
clandestine Nicaraguan rebel arms network had increased drug
trafficking in Costa Rica.
In a 50-2 vote Thursday evening, the assembly approved the
recommendations made in a report by a special congressional
drug commission.
Among its 32 proposals, the commission suggested banning
five Iran-contra figures, including former U.S. Ambassador to
Costa Rica Lewis Tambs.
Along with Tambs, the report named former National Security
Adviser John Poindexter, Lt. Col. Oliver North, ex-CIA station
chief Joe Fernandez and arms dealer Richard Secord.
Citing the Iran-contra record and testimony to the commission
given during a year-long investigation, the report said they
indirectly had contributed to Costa Rica's drug-trafficking woes
by bolstering a clandestine arms network that subsequently was
penetrated by cocaine traffickers.
Costa Rica serves as a transshipment point for South American
cocaine flown in aircraft too small to make the flight to the
United States without stopping to refuel or unload their cargo for
transshipment by other means.
The report also recommended that contra collaborator John Hull
be stripped of his Costa Rica citizenship. Hull, accused of murder
and violating Costa Rican neutrality, jumped bail and skipped the
country last year and now lives in his native Indiana.
Costa Rican courts have instructed the Foreign Ministry to
request Hull's extradition from the United States.
The report also recommended that former Public Security
Minister Benjamin Piza be censured for his participation in the
construction of a clandestine airstrip used to supply the contras.
None of the commission's total 32 recommendations are binding.
END OF ARTICLE
-------------------------------
@@@
901217, Lockerbie, Scotland, Primary source here is from
Conspiracy Nation -- Vol. 6 Num. 70
======================================
("Quid coniuratio est?")
-----------------------------------------------------------------
LOCKERBIE: THE INTERFOR REPORT
==============================
[Primary source here is from Barron's, 12/17/90, "Unwitting
Accomplices?" by Maggie Mahar.]
There is a country south of the United States called Nicaragua.
The United States has been involved there for decades. In the
early part of this century, a General Sandino down there fought
against the United Fruit Company (if my memory serves me
correctly.) So that is where the name "Sandinistas" comes from:
it is derived from the name of the Nicaraguan hero (to some)
General Sandino.
There was a dictator down there named Somoza. FDR said once that
"Somoza may be a son of a bitch, but he's *our* son of a bitch."
Somoza had a son who also became a dictator in Nicaragua, and the
U.S. owned him just like we owned his father. [Source: *The CIA's
Greatest Hits* by Mark Zepezauer]
The people (or the commies) overthrew the second Somoza in 1979.
In the 1980s, Reagan-Bush wanted to go to war down there so we
could get control of Nicaragua back from the commies (or the
people). But the Congress, which had some balls in those days,
wouldn't allow it.
So what happened? Reagan-Bush went around the law and funded a
"covert" war against the people (or the commies) who controlled
Nicaragua. (They should have consulted with bold-as-brass Bill
Clinton, who just "do as he please" in such matters.) One way
they funded their illegal war was, after the planes flew the
weapons down there, they had the planes fly back with drugs.
Readers of Conspiracy Nation know the pattern: guns get traded
for drugs and the banks get a piece of the action.
But the CIA, who helped run this illegal war of the 1980s, are
big-time drug dealers: they are worldwide. To paraphrase Meyer
Lansky, drug kings CIA are "bigger than U.S. Steel."
Ever on the alert for ways to fund their operations, the CIA got
into a separate deal, according to a private-investigation firm
called Interfor Inc. Juval Aviv, head of the firm, helped Pan Am
with its own investigation of the crash of flight 103 near
Lockerbie, Scotland. Here is what seems to have happened, based
on Aviv's report:
Monzer Al-Kassar, a Syrian drugs and arms smuggler, had started a
heroin-smuggling operation at the Frankfurt, Germany airport. Al-
Kassar "reportedly received $1.2 million from a Swiss company
controlled by Albert A. Hakim and retired Air Force Maj. Gen.
Richard V. Secord." These folks, in turn, were part of the Iran-
Contra network. So it seems that this Al-Kassar is not just your
average drug smuggler.
Back around this time, some U.S. citizens were being held hostage
in Lebanon. A deal seems to have been struck: Al-Kassar gets to
keep smuggling heroin into the United States if he will use his
influence to help get the American hostages released.
Al-Kassar was big-time: not so big as CIA, but still having an
impressive underground network of his own. "Al-Kassar also used
his drug-arms routes to purchase and convey arms to the
Nicaraguan Contras." (The Contras were the "secret" army being
funded and supplied by Reagan-Bush with the help of Oliver North.)
The Interfor Report spells it out like this: "[T]ons of heroin
[flowed] into the arms of U.S. citizens... in the hopes that
these terrorists might repay the favor by releasing six hostages
[in Lebanon]."
So to help fund an illegal war in Nicaragua, Al-Kassar got
himself a sweet deal. He seems to have been in a similar position
to that of the late Barry Seal, who also got a sweet deal thanks
to CIA. In fact, many drug smugglers apparently can say a big
"thank you" to CIA for lending them a hand. The CIA employs
criminals, and these criminals get a "perk" -- if they get
caught, they can often just say to DEA, "Hey. I'm CIA, baby."
Ahmed Jibril is the head of the Syrian-sponsored Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine General Command. In Conspiracy
Nation, Vol. 6 Num. 69 was mentioned "...an Iranian Airbus, with
290 people on board, was shot down by an American warship in the
Gulf in the summer of 1988." Jibril was under pressure to avenge
the downing of that aircraft.
Jibril, it is alleged, persuaded Al-Kassar to substitute a bomb
for the usual heroin. "The Samsonite case was then substituted
for one of the checked suitcases..."
You will recall that, in CN 6.69, the London Telegraph reported
that
Within hours of Pan Am flight 103 devastating the Scottish
border village of Lockerbie in December 1988, a team of
American secret agents was methodically working its way
through the crash site.
By the following morning a small area on the outskirts of
the town had been sealed off. The Americans removed a
suitcase full of heroin and some incriminating documents
from a U.S. undercover agent, who died in the crash, and was
taking part in a "sting" drug smuggling operation in Lebanon.
This seems to confirm the heroin-link in the Lockerbie tragedy.
CIA veteran Victor Marchetti favors the conclusions of the
Interfor Report: "I have always thought the essence of the
Interfor Report was true," he is quoted as saying.
-------------------------------
@@@
941022, New Orleans, LA, Washington Post. Oliver North claims to
Date: Fri Feb 16, 1996 11:44 pm CST
From: Moderator of conference justice.polabuse
EMS: INTERNET / MCI ID: 376-5414
MBX: bwitanek@igc.apc.org
TO: * David Beiter / MCI ID: 635-1762
Subject: CIA Contra Crack Connection
From: Bob Witanek
Subject: Police
To: JLowery@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu, Freematt@aol.com
9 Cops Indicted in New Orleans
NEW ORLEANS (Reuter) - Nine New Orleans police officers, including one
arrested earlier for ordering a murder, were indicted for drug trafficking by
a federal grand jury Wednesday.
Eastern Louisiana district U.S. Attorney Eddie J. Jordan said the
officers, who face 15 years to life in prison if convicted, were charged with
protecting the storage and movement of more than 130 kilograms of cocaine.
One of the men, Len Davis, was arrested Monday after Federal Bureau of
Investigation wiretaps revealed he plotted and then celebrated the Oct. 13
death of a woman who had filed a brutality complaint against him for
pistol-whipping a teenager.
Other officers indicted were Davis' patrol partner, Sammy L. Williams Jr.,
Christopher Evans, Adam E. Dees, Sgt. Carlos Rodriguez, Keith Johnson, Brian
K. Brown, Sheldon Polk and Larry Smith Jr., a juvenile division officer.
FBI Special Agent in Charge Neil Gallagher said the officers protected a
warehouse where the cocaine was stored and were paid in excess of $97,000 in
bribes. Some of the officers used official New Orleans police cars in the
conspiracy to distribute the cocaine.
He said the drugs were under FBI special agents' control at all times and
were not distributed on the streets of New Orleans.
New Orleans Police Superintendent Richard Pennington, who took charge of
the department in October, was briefed on the investigation and provided
valuable assistance, Gallagher and Jordan said. His predecessor, Joseph
Orticke, was not informed of the lengthy investigation, police sources told
Reuters.
Additional information is not available because the investigation and
federal grand jury probe are continuing, Jordan said.
Davis, 30, was arrested Monday by the FBI for conspiring to violate the
civil rights of 32-year-old Kim Groves, who was shot to death.
Transmitted: 94-12-07 15:43:17 EST
-----------------------------
@@@
950304, San Francisco, CA, San Jose Mercury News (AP).
San Francisco (AP) - Reporters have no right to see police files
of public complaints of officer misconduct, even with the
officers' names left out, a state appeals court ruled Friday.
State law provides only for disclosure of data showing the
number, type and disposition of complaints against officers, said
the 1st District Court of Appeal.
That law should be interpreted "liberally in favor of disclosure"
said Presiding Justice Ming Chin in the 3-0 ruling. But he said
a request by the San Francisco Bay Guardian for police files from
the city of Richmond was too broad.
State law "imposes confidentiality upon peace officer personnel
records of investigations of citizens' complaints," with limited
exceptions, Chin said.
A lawyer for the weekly newspaper said the ruling was troubling.
"How police are doing their jobs, including disciplining
themselves, is receding into secrecy, and that's just not
healthy," James Wheaton said.
He said the ruling appeared to entitle the public only to a
limited amount of statistical information about police complaints
and not descriptions of cases and other pertinent details. If a
police department doesn't keep statistics on complaints of racial
abuse, no information on the subject will be released.
Assistant City Attorney Everett Jenkins said Richmond regularly
releases statistics about police complaints but opposed release
about additional information from complaint files, even with the
officers' names removed.
-----------------------------
@@@
950407, New York City, NY, NT Times.
Date: Fri Apr 07, 1995 7:01 pm CST
From: drctalk l
EMS: INTERNET / MCI ID: 376-5414
MBX: drctalk-l@netcom.com
TO: * David Beiter / MCI ID: 635-1762
Subject: NY TIMES on Police Corruption
Times reports today (4/7 s.B pg. 1) "Three More In Precinct Are Accused"
Lead reads:
"The window on corruption in the troubled 30th Precinct in
Harlem widened slightly yesterday with perjury accusations
against a sergeant and two officers who were charged with lying
about arrests that were made illegally and about evidence that
they seized unconstitutionally to put suspected drug dealers
behind bars.
"The arrests, announced by D.A. Robert Morgenthau of
Manhattan and Police Commissioner William J. Bratton, raised to
33 the number of officers implicated in the past year in the most
sweeping scandal in one precinct in city history. It has touched
more than one of every six of the 192 officers assigned to the
precinct, which has come to be known as the 'Dirty Thirty'."
"But unlike most of the previously arrested 30th Precinct
officers, who have been accused of operating like gangs, stealing
drugs, guns and money, beating up dealers and sometimes breaking
down doors, those arrested yesterday were described by some
officials as merely overzealous officers who had broken the law
to enforce it, and then had lied about what had happened."
"The authorities said that the officers had joined others in
forcing their way into drug dealers' apartments and ransacking
them without search warrants to find hidden drugs or weapons,
then had falsified arrest records and backed them up backed them
up with testimony, saying that they had entered the suspect's
apartments legally and had only taken evidence left out in plain
view."
The rest gets better with Bratton defending the officers,
citing the "extraordinarily difficult task" of enforcing drug
laws. Bratton also estimates that "only" about 1% of NYC's cops
are corrupt. (Please hold your laughter until the end).
I think we ought to push on the corruption issue. The Times
also reports today (s.B pg. 2) that a 13 yr. veteran cop from
the 90th Precinct in Brooklyn was convicted yesterday of drug
trafficking. Corruption is clearly the inevitable result of
prohibition, and it worries a lot of people who are currently
pressing for civilian review boards. They are barking up the
wrong tree, as we know.
If anyone wants the full text of either article, please
email me, I didn't want to clutter the line w/them. If enough
people want them, I will post them. Also, if this posting was in
itself inappropriate for this forum, someone please let me know,
I'm not looking to cause problems.
Adam J. Smith PEACE, Adam
Peace 2000
ajsmitty@bu.edu
-----------------------------
@@@
950414, Puerto Rico.
Article: misc.activism.progressive.21959
Message-ID: <3MUQO5$IRT@NEWS.MISSOURI.EDU>
From: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu (Rich Winkel)
Subject: PUERTO RICAN JOURNAL
CRITICA: A JOURNAL OF PUERTO RICAN POLICY & POLITICS
Drug Trafficking in Puerto Rico:
Narcopolitics, Tax Havens, Migration and National Security
Juan M. Garcia Passalacqua
For over a month now, Puerto Rico has been taken by storm by
controversies filling all front pages on the corrupting
effects of the drug trade on local lawyering and politics.
It has become an urgent issue for the future of Puerto Rico.
Most recently, for example, a legislative commission held
close hearings and dropped a bombshell by indiscriminately
announcing the names of five Puerto Rican legislators that
they contended had some drug connections: representatives
Nicolas Nogueras and Freddie Valentin of the governing New
Progressive Party (PNP), senators Marco A. Rigau and Antonio
Fas Alzamora and representative Jose Enrique Arrar_s of the
Popular Democratic Party (PPD).
-----------------------------
@@@
950510, Beaver Dam, WI, Wisconsin State Journal.
Date: Fri May 19, 1995 11:24 pm CST
From: drctalk l
EMS: INTERNET / MCI ID: 376-5414
MBX: drctalk-l@netcom.com
TO: * David Beiter / MCI ID: 635-1762
Subject: Slain by narcs for 3 grams
From the Wisconsin State Journal, May 10 1995
WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIM FILED IN DRUG RAID
Victim's parents call shooting unjustified
By Richard W. Jaeger regional Reporter
The parents of Scott Bryant, who was killed by a law enforcement bullet
in a raid on his trailer home north of Beaver Dam, have filed a wrongful
death claim with Dodge County.
The claim by Boyd and Shirley Bryant seeks damages from Dodge County on
behalf of their slain son and his family. The Bryants claim a Dodge
County sheriff's official was not justified in shooting and killing
their son.
Bryant, 29, was killed April 17 by a bullet to the chest. Preliminary
reports show that Dodge County Sheriff Detective Robert Neuman fired the
fatal shot.
Neuman told investigators he could not remember pulling the trigger on
his police Beretta.
The State attorney general's office has completed it's investigation of
the shooting and sent its reports to Dodge County District Attorney
Patricia Remirez and Sheriff Stephen Fitzgerald.
Fitzgerald said he could not comment on the report until it is reviewed
by Ramirez
A spokesman for Ramirez said the District Attorney had not read the
report and was not ready to comment.
The District attorney has the authority to file charges in the shooting
if necessary.
James Haney, a spokesman for the state attorney general, said the state
investigation will not make any recommendations as to charges in the
case. He also would not reveal the findings of the investigation.
Beaver Dam Attorney Scott Rasmussen said he had been promised a copy of
the investigation report by the district attorney and by the state
attorney general since he had court approval to investigate possible
wrongful actions in Bryant's death.
He said Tuesday that he had not seen the report but would proceed to
file the wrongful death claim without it.
"We will be claiming that the shooting was both negligent and an
intentional act. Both of those are questions for a jury to determine,"
Rasmussen said.
The Beaver Dam attorney said he expects the claim to be denied by the
county, opening the way for him to file a lawsuit.
Rasmussen said he will file the suit in federal court and be asking for
specific damages. He has six months to file the suit after the claim is
denied.
He would not comment on possible criminal action by the district
attorney because he had not seen the investigation report.
"We do know from the preliminary report that the officer who shot Scott
said he couldn't remember how. And there appear to be conflicting
statements from witnesses to the shooting," Rasmussen said.
Neighbors to Bryant's trailer home in the North Hills Trailer Court said
officers kicked in the door without knocking. One neighbor said she
heard "a kick, a pop, and a scream" and the next thing she knew Bryant
was dead.
Officers say they knocked and announced they were serving a warrant for
drugs.
According to the preliminary report, Neuman said he had his gun drawn as
he followed fellow deputy James Rohr into the trailer. Rohr said he
knocked first.
The deputies found a small amount of marijuana in the trailer in the
trailer along with two .22-caliber rifle and five pellet guns.
-----------------------------------------------------------
(End of Article) I have not been able to learn much more. The DA's
office says they will turn it over to another County's prosecutor.
Scott Rasmussen tells me the Officer admitted the gun was cocked when he
entered the apartment. The Atty general's office won't even send me
their press release. Very little in the press. Guess that's what
happens if you get killed on a bad news day. (the night before OKC).
-------------------------
On Tuesday, 30 May, beginning at 8:00 a vigil will commence in memory of
Scott Bryant, a Beaver Dam Wisconsin man gunned down in front of his 7
year old son by a Dodge County sheriff.
The vigil will be held on the 100 block of West Washington St. in
Madison Wisconsin in front of the Lorraine Building which houses the
State Dept. of Justice.
Scott was killed by a sheriff who (a) doesn't remember pulling the
trigger and (b) thought Scott's remote control was a firearm. After
killing Scott in front of his 7 year old son, police were able to find
only 3 GRAMS of marijuana. The District Atty for Dodge County has yet
to begin an investigation into the events surrounding Mr. Bryant's
death.
Date: 27 Jul 95 04:06:33 EDT
From: Tom Ender <73511.3611@COMPUSERVE.COM>
Subject: Marijuana MURDER !
To:
Hemp HOMICIDE ...
I'd like to provide more details and some corrections to the earlier
"Marijuana MURDER" post about the killing of Scott Bryant of Beaver Dam, WI in
April. There can be no question that this was an appalling abuse of power by
local law enforcement. However, we should ensure that we don't let a few
minor inaccuracies detract from the credibility of people who use this as an
example of the Drug War nightmare.
The original post asserts that the police found three grams of hemp and
no guns. It was actually 24 grams (less than an ounce) and the police did find
a rifle and a pellet gun when they searched Bryant's trailer. The police admit
that Bryant was unarmed and offered no resistance, and that the hunting
weapons found later in the trailer played no role whatsoever.
It is not true that Bryant's seven-year-old son Colten "watched his
father die". What happened was arguably even more nightmarish and bizarre. No
member of Bryant's family was with him when he died because the police did not
notify anyone. A neighbor called Bryant's parents, who had to _guess_ which
hospital their son had been sent to. Colten Bryant, Scott's son, cowered in
his bedroom for over an hour after the shooting until the deputies found him
and brought him out. When he finally arrived at the hospital, the police still
had not told him what happened. It was his grandfather who told him, "You have
to be brave. They shot Daddy."
Detective Robert Neumann, the deputy who fired the shot, has been Dodge
County's highest-profile narcotics officer for years. He is county coordinator
for CEASE (Cannabis Eradication and Suppression Effort). In the past five
years, he has attended at least 57 classes and conferences ranging from
"Cannabis Detection" to "SWAT shoot". In spite of his credentials as an
experienced drug warrior, Neumann maintains he does not even _remember_
pulling the trigger!
As if the story wasn't bad enough already, political power and pull also
appears to have played a significant role in this tragedy. Detective Neumann,
Bryant's killer, is the chairman of the Dodge County Republican Party, and
has campaigned for Sheriff Stephen Fitzgerald since the sheriff was first
elected in 1988. His ability to make front-page news via drug busts and cash
seizures - just prior to strategic elections - has made him a valuable asset
in Sheriff Fitzgerald's election bids. Detective Neumann himself was recently
elected to the Beaver Dam school board.
An internal investigation by the District Attorney ruled the shooting
"not in any way justified". However, no criminal charges were filed, not
even negligent use of a firearm. After a two-month hiatus (with pay)
during the investigation, Detective Robert Neumann was returned to
active duty. According to Sheriff Fitzgerald, "The detective has
suffered enough. He has had the wrath of God on him since this
happened."
Fact Sources: "North Country Libertarian" Libertarian Party of Wisconsin,
March/April Issue
"Isthmus" Madison Weekly Newspaper,
Vol 20, No. 26, June 30-July 6 Issue
Let Freedom Ring!
...Tom Ender (OS/2Warp/GCP 2.11-73511.3611@compuserve.com)
-----------------------------
@@@
950607, Cali, Columbia.
Date: Wed, 7 Jun 1995 20:44:55 -0500
From: carlolsen@dsmnet.com (Carl E. Olsen)
To: drctalk@drcnet.org
Subject: Ex-Justice lawyer indicted
Message-ID: <9506080144.AA27804@DSM6.DSMNET.COM>
The Des Moines Register
Tuesday, June 6, 1995 3A
Ex-Justice
lawyer named
in drug probe
Indictments charge 60
in smuggling conspiracy
The former prosecutor later went to work for the Colombian cocaine cartel.
Miami, Fla. (AP) -- The man who as the government's extradition expert
once helped bring Colombian drug smugglers and other foreign criminals to
justice in the United States was among three U.S. lawyers accused in a drug
smuggling conspiracy Monday.
More than 60 people were charged in the case, including the former
Justice Department official and a former federal prosecutor. Three other
lawyers, including a second federal prosecutor, have pleaded guilty to
reduced charges.
One of the lawyers named in the indictment was Michael Abbell, who once
headed the international affairs office of the Justice Department's criminal
division. Abbell's duties included heading efforts to bring the Cali cartel
smugglers to justice in the United States.
The charges against the former Justice Department lawyers stemmed from
activities after they left the department, authorities said.
Officials said the lawyers warned potential witnesses to keep silent,
provided drug money to relatives of cartel associates being prosecuted and
fabricated evidence for use in Colombia to obstruct prosecution.
U.S. Attorney Kendall Coffey called the indictment "the single most
significant prosecution in history against the Cali cartel."
After leaving government service, Abbell represented reputed cartel
leader Gilberto Rodriguez-Orejuela.
Another of the lawyers, William Moran, was accused of tipping the cartel
to the identity of an informant who was later killed. Moran lawyer Marty
Weinberg said his client is innocent.
"These lawyers defended clients charged with drug crimes aggressively,"
said Roy Black, Abbell's attorney. "They did all the things lawyers are
supposed to do and now they're charged."
The investigation, dubbed Operation Cornerstone, provided one of the most
detailed pictures yet of the sophisticated Cali cartel and especially how it
used U.S. defense lawyers to deliver money, falsify evidence and even
deliver warnings to those in jail about the hazards of cooperation, federal
agents said.
The cartel, which is run like a Fortune 500 company, has smuggled 200,000
kilograms of cocaine into the United States since 1983 and is responsible
for bringing in 80 percent of the cocaine circulating in this country,
federal officials said.
The indictment also charged cartel leaders Miguel Rodriguez-Orejuela,
Gilberto Rodriguez-Orejuela, Jose Santacruz-Londono and Helmer
Herrera-Buitrago and dozens of distributors and managers in Latin America
and the southeastern United States. Earlier indictments named many of the
leading figures in the Cali cartel.
About a third of the people named in the indictment are in the United
States. Federal officials said 22 had been arrested by Monday.
"Lawyers have a license to practice law," said James Milford, special
agent in charge of the Drug Enforcement Administration's Miami field office.
"But they don't have a license to be above the law."
The indictments also charged lawyers Moran and former Assistant U.S.
Attorney Donald L. Ferguson of Boca Raton with involvement in the cartel's
smuggling enterprise.
********************************************************************
* Carl Olsen * carlolsen@dsmnet.com *
* Post Office Box 4091 * http://www.calyx.com/~olsen/ *
* Des Moines, Iowa 50333 * Carl_E._Olsen@commonlink.com *
* (515) 243-7351 voice & fax * 73043.414@compuserve.com *
********************************************************************
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 08 Jun 1995 12:23:51 -0400 (Thu)
From: gdk@mhis.bix.com (Gary Kendall)
Subject: Cocaine net lands US prosecutors
To: libernet@Dartmouth.EDU
The Electronic Telegraph Thursday 8 June 1995
[World News]
Cocaine net lands US prosecutors
BY CHARLES LAURENCE IN NEW YORK
THREE former US government prosecutors have been charged along with
four alleged Colombian cocaine barons and 55 other alleged smugglers,
money launderers and corrupt lawyers.
The indictment is against the Cali cartel, responsible for an
estimated 80 per cent of cocaine traffic to America. Twenty-two of
those charged, including the former prosecutors, have been arrested.
Michael Abbell, former head of the Justice Department's Office of
Internal Affairs, and Donald Ferguson, a former prosecutor in Miami,
charged with racketeering and conspiracy, face life imprisonment
without parole if convicted.
The alleged offences were committed after the former prosecutors had
gone into private practice. Joel Rosenthal, former federal prosecutor
in New York and Miami, has pleaded guilty to money laundering.
The four alleged Cali cartel leaders are Miguel Rodriguez-Orejuela,
his brother Gilberto Rodriguez-Orejuela, Jose Santacruz-Londono and
Helmer Herrera-Buitrago.
The four and many others on the charge sheets are in Cali or other
locations outside the United States, and are unlikely to be brought to
trial in an American court.
Two more American lawyers netted by Operation Cornerstone are William
Moran, charged with identifying an informant who was later murdered by
the cartel, and former assistant US attorney Donald Ferguson of Boca
Raton, Florida, charged with involvement in smuggling cocaine.
------------------------------
@@@
950608, Arizona.
Date: Thu, 8 Jun 95 12:27:44 PDT
From: karnow@cup.portal.com
Subject: "Computer error" not a basis for suppressing evidence
Original-Subject: Unlawful arrest based on computer error does not lead to
exclusion of evidence
The United States Supreme Court in Arizona v. Evans (March 1, 1995)
discussed an illegal arrest precipitated by a "computer error." A man was
arrested based on what police officers thought was an outstanding warrant
for his arrest; in fact the warrant had been quashed; court clerical
personnel had failed to clear the warrant from their computer system. The
police thus had no legal basis for the arrest.
Following the arrest, the police found a bag of marijuana. The issue was
whether the marijuana evidence should be suppressed (which would have the
effect of dismissing the case). The state court threw out the evidence under
the old suppression rule -- holding that the "fruit" (drugs) of the
poisonous tree (the illegal arrest) should not come into evidence. The U.S.
Supreme Court reversed, and held that the purpose of the exclusionary rule
-- to encourage proper police procedures -- would not be furthered by
tossing the evidence.
The Supreme Court found that excluding the evidence would not have a
significant effect on the actions of court personal, and thus that errors by
court clerks were not a basis for excluding evidence. The Court did not
address whether court personnel's outright misconduct, and such personnel's
deliberate efforts to violate peoples' constitutional rights, would lead to
the exclusion of evidence, but the reasoning in this case strongly suggests
that such misconduct would *not* lead to exclusion.
@@@
950623, Latin America.
Date: Mon Jun 26, 1995 8:41 pm CST
From: IATP
EMS: INTERNET / MCI ID: 376-5414
MBX: iatp@igc.apc.org
TO: * David Beiter / MCI ID: 635-1762
Subject: NAFTA & Inter-Am Trade Monitor 6/23
NAFTA & Inter-American Trade Monitor
Produced by the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy
June 23, 1995
Volume 2, Number 19
INTER-AMERICAN DRUG TRADE
Cocaine and other drugs represent a large segment of agricultural
production in the Americas and a significant aspect of international
commerce. In 1993, in Colombia alone, coca planting was estimated
at 42,000 hectares, with an additional 20,000 hectares in poppies
and 6-8,000 hectares in marijuana. The Colombian government
claims that coca and other drug production has doubled since 1993,
due to defense of producers by guerrillas, who charge a tax for
protecting growers, laboratories, and air fields.
As officially reported Colombian export income shot up by 29.8
percent (from $1.1 billion to $1.4 billion) in the first two months of
1995, compared to the same period in 1994, many experts say that
the sharp increase is due in part to fraudulent invoicing to hide drug
profits. Colombian drug profits are estimated at $800 million to $3
billion annually.
While drug cartels make large amounts of money, drug couriers
receive relatively low pay and are at relatively high risk. Producers,
too, receive far less money than those controlling marketing and
distribution, and are frequently the targets of international action to
destroy their fields. In the face of U.S. demands that the Bolivian
government eradicate their fields, Bolivian coca producers joined
with teachers and labor unions in national protests over neoliberal
government policies and low wages. In April, the government
responded to the strikes and protests by declaring a state of siege.
Tarahumara Indians in remote villages of northern Mexico have been
brought into marijuana and opium poppy production by Mexican
cartels. Initially, the relatively high returns on drug cultivation
attracted some farmers. Drug cartels later used violence and threats
of violence to consolidate and maintain their hold on production.
Mexican police and government officials frequently collaborate with
the cartels, removing any avenue of appeal for campesinos who
would prefer not to cooperate. Drug trafficking allegedly involves
such high officials as the sons of billionaire Carlos Hank Gonzalez and
the brother of ex-president Carlos Salinas.
Although the United States and Europe are still the primary markets
for cocaine exports from Latin America, Argentina and Chile have
also increased domestic consumption in recent years. Argentina is a
transit country for cocaine from Peru and Colombia, some of which is
processed into hydrochloride by Bolivian-Argentine joint ventures.
Most cocaine consumed in or passing through Chile comes from
Bolivia. The cocaine trade has fueled a real estate boom in some
Chilean cities, and benefits from banking secrecy in Chile.
Nor is government corruption by drug money limited to Mexico and
Latin American countries. In early June, a former senior official in
the U.S. Justice Department's "war on drugs," two other former Justice
Department officials, and two former federal prosecutors in Florida
were indicted in Miami on charges of participating in a cocaine
smuggling conspiracy. According to the New York Times, "So many
Miami lawyers are under indictment at any one time that courts
have been obliged to hold special hearings to inform their clients that
their lawyers may have conflicts in representing them because the
lawyers may also be bargaining with the prosecution for
themselves."
"Mexico: Narcos at the Heart of the State;" "Argentina: "White Coffee"
Boom;" "Chile: Cocaine Enters Politics;" THE GEOPOLITICAL DRUG
DISPATCH, May, 1995; Anthony DePalma, "Mexico's Indians Face New
Conquistador: Drugs," NEW YORK TIMES, 6/2/95; Neil A. Lewis, "U.S.
Charging Ex-Prosecutors in a Drug Case," NEW YORK TIMES, 6/6/95;
Monica Iturralde Andrade, "Colombian Traffickers Use Ecuadorians to
Smuggle Narcotics," INTERPRESS SERVICE, May, 1995; "Coca Growers
Ready for Dialogue," COCA PRESS, April 26-May 2, 1995; Yadira
Ferrer, "Narcoguerrillas Said Raking in Money," INTERPRESS SERVICE,
May 8, 1995; "Bolivia: Strikes End, But State of Siege Continues,"
NOTISUR, May 12, 1995; Yadira Ferrer, "Drugs and Exports,"
INTERPRESS SERVICE, June 5, 1995.
-----------------------------
@@@
950623, Philadelphia, PA, Inquirer. Fifteen more drug cases
libernet
Date: Fri, 23 Jun 1995 13:01:17 -0400
From: Mark Jones
To: libernet@Dartmouth.EDU
*** Police admit to planting drugs on the innocent ***
Ever want to explain to someone that drug laws are just too easy
for law enforcement folks to abuse? Well, here is some great evidence
of just how out of hand it can get.
Within:
"The arresting officers... all have admitted they lied about
drug arrests and searches... and have pleaded guilty to federal charges."
15 MORE DRUG CASES OVERTURNED
The costs could be huge for Philadelphia. Suits are likely over
the 39th I District police corruption. -
By Mark Faziollah INQUIRER STAFF WRITER
It could force the review of a thousand drug cases.
Put hundreds of drug defendants back on the streets.
And cost the city millions.
Yesterday, as a specially assigned judge dismissed charges against
13 more defendants, Philadelphia got its loudest warning yet of the potential
enormity of the 39th District police-corruption scandal's impact.
First Deputy District Attorney,Arnold H. Gordon, a veteran prosecutor in
the odd role of requesting a mass acquittal - asked Common Pleas Judge Legrome
D. Davis to reverse the defendants' 15 cases "in the interest of justice."
The arresting officers in the cases - five former 39th District
policemen - all have admitted they lied about drug arrests and searches in the
North Philadelphia district between 1988 and 1991, and have pleaded guilty
to federal charges.
Yesterday's dismissals bring to 27 the total number of drug defendants
whose cases were dismissed because of the federal investigation. And Public
Defender Bradley Bridge, who represented most of the defendants at yesterday's
hearing, said it's just the beginning.
"Many innocent defendants have spent years in prison," Bridge said.
"Sadly, this is not yet even the tip of the iceberg. Many, many more cases
will follow."
Davis appeared to accept Bridge's prediction. He said he would handle
-all future requests for dismissals arising from the 39th District
investigation, thus speeding the process. The five former officers were
indicted Feb. 28. They have since pleaded guilty to obstructing defendants'
civil rights, and have agreed to help federal prosecutors expand the
investigation.
Bridge said after the hearing that his preliminary review of past drug
cases showed the five officers handled 200 cases in 1988 alone, and that his
office later this week would begin reviewing all arrests made by the five
officers between 1987 and 1994.
Eventually, he predicted, a thou.sand cases would have to be reexamined
and hundreds of convictions could be overturned.
Thus far, all 12 of the drug cases the public defender has submitted
for review by the District Attorney's Office have been dismissed.
And each case is a potential lawsuit.
Deputy City Solicitor James B. Jordan said he was "expecting a whole
bunch" of suits related to the 39th District scandal.
"This could have very significant financial implications," Jordan said
after yesterday's hearing.
Several of the defendants already are talking of suing.
There is Betty Patterson, 53, who completed her three-year prison term
last year and was on parole until her charges were dismissed yesterday.
John Baird, a former 39th District officer who pleaded guilty to
corruption charges, has said police framed Patterson and planted drugs in her
North Philadelphia home - in an effort, Baird contended, to get evidence in
a separate case against her three sons.
Patterson wore a big smile after the hearing but declined to comment.
Her attorney, Jennifer St. Hill, has notified the city that a suit is imminent.
John Wayne Coleman, who spent the last four years in prison, had all his
drug charges dismissed yesterday.
"When they came into my house, they never acknowledged they were
police," Coleman told reporters at the hearing. "Before this conviction, I
wasn't in trouble for 10 years."
Coleman's attorney, Adrian J. Moody, said his client, too, would sue
the city.
In addition to dismissing the convictions of Patterson and Coleman
and the 13 other cases, Judge Davis also began expunging the defendants'
records of all information about the arrests.
Officially, Betty Patterson, who was accompanied at yesterday's hearing
by six of her relatives, now has no criminal record.
"Fortunately, the truth finally came out," said Daniel-Paul Alva,
Patterson's original trial lawyer, who attended yesterday's hearing.
"The police woke up that day and said they were going to make her a criminal."
Davis also dismissed charges against defendants identified as Denise
Patterson (no relation to Betty) , Andre Bonaparte (who had three cases
dismissed), Daniel Briggs, Clinton Cotton, Clifford Foster, Lonyo Holmes, Larry
Maddox, Anthony Thomason, Steven Trotty, John Walker and Wanda Wilson.
Typically, the defendants had been convicted of possessing crack
cocaine with intent to deliver.
Briggs and Thomason had never been convicted. They ' had been sought
by authorities since they failed to appear in court shortly after their 19
88 arrests. Davis ordered their arrest warrants withdrawn.
"They can come home again," attorney Bridge said.
He said the only time Briggs and Thomason had been arrested was when
they were picked up by the former 39th District officers.
Later this week, Bridge said, he intends to ask the District Attorney's
Office to dismiss 10 to 20 additional cases - selected from the 200 he has
identified from 1988 files. He said he would seek immediate attention for
cases involving defendants still imprisoned.
Denise Patterson, one of those cleared yesterday, was an 18-year-old
nursing student when she was arrested in November 1988. Though she did not
attend the hearing, she has steadfastly maintained she was innocent of drug
charges,
"We'll sue," said her attorney, Vincent J. Ziccardi. "Now the fun begins."
-- end --
Date: Thu, 17 Aug 1995 14:07:37 -0500 (EST)
From: HATHAWAY@stsci.edu
To: drctalk@drcnet.org
Subject: Tip of Iceberg
Message-ID: <01HU6KR3FU9EHV425Z@AVION.STSCI.EDU>
Aug 17, 1995
The Wash. Post Page A-3
_Police Scandal Creates Storm In Philadelphia_
.. Geroge Porchea was released from jail last month after serving more than
two years on drug charges...
.. the officers who arrested him in 1988 pleaded guilty earlier this year to
a three-year rampage of making false arrests, planting drugs, filing bogus
police reports and robbing victims in Philadelphia's 39th Police District.
Porchea's case is part of the first wave of what probably will be hundreds
of overturned convictions in cases involving the five officers implicated
in the scandal. Forty cases have been overturned so far, and some people,
like Porcheas, have been released from prison. ...
To date, 16 lawsuits or notices of lawsuits have been logged in ...
Betty Patterson, for instance, is seeking $7 million to compensate
for the three years she spent in prison. The officers who arrested
her admitted planting the drugs found in her home, said her attorney,
Jennifer St. Hill. Patterson, 53, is a churchgoing grandmother with
no prior criminal record. St. Hill called her client's prison time
"a hellish experience."
.. estimates at least 1,400 cases involving the officers will be
reviewed...
The 39th Police District covers a poor, mostly black swatch of North
Philadelphia... "... the officers preyed on, their lack of resources
and credibility."
At the time of his arrest, George Porchea was ... sleeping at his
girlfriend's house when several officers broke down the door the night
of Jan. 5, 1988, ransacked the house and herded him and his girlfriend's
brother into a police van, according to his attorney...
... the two were locked in the van for six hours while police got
a search warrant and planted crack cocaine in the house. At the
police station, she said, officers beat Porchea into a confession.
When the case went to court, Boyce said Porchea was advised by
his attorney at the time to plead guilty so he could get a lessor
sentence.
"Juries tend to believe police, and think people who push drugs
are dirty slime," Boyce said. "What could he do when these four
officers were alleging they took crack cocaine from him?"
..
.. getting financial compensation won't be easy. Although the
five officers have admitted guilt, they are "judgement-proof"
because they have no money.
.. the "word on the street" is that up to another dozen or so
police officers ma